Just a response to Bezo's reply to my earlier posting:
Well, Bezo, maybe I also understand your mindset, but what that assumption is clearly ignoring is.....
It is funny though, how after nearly a century of the most intense debate we two 'armchair admirals' can finally arrive at the true causes for the failure of the Grand Fleet to decisively eliminate the High Seas Fleet. But what the hell, I've just read a book, and I'm away from home, so here goes...
as for Nelson's dictum, I don't agree it would've been a good idea;
Right? Are we here refering to:
"The Business of the English commander-in-chief being first to bring an enemy fleet to battle on the most advantageous terms to himself, (I mean that of laying his ships close on board the enemy, as expeditiously as possible); and secondly to continue them there until the business is decided"
Well, that depends on how we interpret what is actually being said here. Certainly, the first part makes perfect sense, but if you are inferring that I was advocating that Jellicoe and his ships actually operate in the exact same manner as with Nelson's tactics of heading staright into the enemy to engage at close quarters, even boarding, then I fear you mistake me for a poltron. The point I was actually making is that during the long peace, after the Napoleonic wars, and Gt Britains emergence as the preminent power, the application of initiative and training in the tactics and use of warships was largely ignored. True, Nelson was held up as an ideal, but not many naval officers were inclined or encouraged to develop new ways of fighting.
Certainly, the loss of the Victoria in 1893 was a terrible tragedy, and with the loss of Sir George Tryon, iniative in signalling lapsed; but the actual circumstances of the collision with the Camperdown perfectly illustrated just how badly the rot had set in, with Captain Markham prefering to follow an order that he knew would end in disaster, rather than follow common sense and disobey; and the same scene was being played out on the bridge of the Victoria, with officers standing around Tryon, knowing that his orders were impossible to obey without a collision, yet none being able to inform him. Significantly, Jellicoe was a survivor from the Victoria.
Obviously, there were many factors that contributed to the unsatisfactory outcome of Jutland, at least from the British perspective. Certainly Von Scheer was trying to lure Beattie's force onto the teeth of his main fleet using Hipper's force as the bait. Notwithstanding the better build of German battlecruisers, otherwise, the German fleet was not in a superior position to comprehensively defeat Jellicoe's entire fleet, and Von Scheer knew this; he even had some fairly antiquated pre dreadnoughts in his fleet, which were a liability. I'm adopting the assumption that the best he could hope for would be a 'win' in as much as a part of the british fleet would be destroyed. But (as we all know) the British knew (finally) what he was about, having intecepted his signals and being able to read the German code; so, in effect, Beattie was intending to turn the tables and lure the Germans back onto Jellicoe's main force.
One of the notable failures on the British side was in signalling; even, if we allow the stretch, the criminal ignoring of the early intelligence that told them that the High Seas Fleet was at sea. And yes, Beattie was very remiss in not properly signalling to Evan Thomas the turn he was making, putting too far a distance between his Battlecruisers and the four 'Queens', so leaving the Battlecruisers exposed too long before the Queens could come up in support. Again, where was Nelson's example? When Evan Thomas came down to Rosyth and moored close to Beattie, he was never invited aboard, as not being part of his 'set', he was a Jellico man. Even allowing for the vast diferences between the ships in Nelson's day to those at Jutland, the simple fact was that there was poor communication and a lack of initiative always at play, and before we go further, the German fleet suffered just as much from rigid control.
The mention of Jellicoe's delay in pressing his advantage due to a fear of a torpedo attack is also significant. There is a strong opinion in more recent analysis that this was the wrong decision, as the risk was not sufficient to deter the advantage, and by implication, an admiral of Nelson's mind-set would have taken the risk, and got Sheer's fleet where he wanted him. A modern example could be 'Sandy' Woodward, who was apparently quoted as saying: "fuck the rule book, we are going to fight this my way". In actual fact Scheer got lucky, he was able to execute a well-rehearsed about turn to flee the British fleet, and also managed to get pass the British during the night to safety. If he had been (as should have happened) trapped between his base and the British, the outcome would have been a comprehensive annihilation of his fleet. That would have been catastrophic to Geramn moral, and quite possibly have gretaly shortened the war. as it happened it did niot make the final outcome any different. The Royal Navy continued its blockade of Germany, craeting mass starvation, it was able keep the channel open continuoulsy for the support of its army; it also allowed the movement of millions of US servicemen across the atlantic, in alliance with the USN. Even the belated switch to total u-boat warfare did not to prevent ultimate victory.
Sorry, got to go LP is on the warpath, and threatening me with unrestricted ear bashing