Ok, better, but since you've (correctly) got the very-long range SPS-39 on the foremast, I'd recommend you to check my Baltimore-class flagship conversions. The experience in the USN was that a pole mast, albeit however, well girded, would cause so much vibrations as to render the operation and accuracy of that radar nil. But, here's a caution, due to the very different heights of your funnels vs mine (Flagship Baltimores), I'd not recommend the transfer of the heavy mast of those Baltimores, but it ought to give you an idea how to solve the issue of gaining a stable electronics platform. And I still think you should delete the aftermost MK37 FCS. It is not necessary. Oh, one thing you might consider: by 1976, the open flagbridge on the tower would've been, at the very least semi-enclosed, if not fully so. Also, in all probability, many of the empty guntubs, such as the one aft of the main flagbridge and the one above Nos7-8 5" turrets would've been deleted or suppressed. In the former case, you may, with advantage increase the flagbridge area, expand the bridge wings and, perhaps make it fully enclosed. Afterall, it is a fleet flagship, right?
ace: I did write thusly:
And, lastly, if you equipped the ship with Sea Sparrow, that would hardly be feasible in 1976. New constructions, such as the OH Perrys and the Spruances, sure, but no earlier conversions.
- So I think I covered my sixes there. Now, who's not reading posts carefully?
As for the comment on volume/displacement: yes, I believe you're right about the theory that the Montana would turn out lighter STD in this configuration. However, do remember that the Iowas were overly wet ships, with a heavy roll; frequently being awash amidships and taking seas over their bows. The Montanas, with only slightly larger dimensions would've been no different. Besides, I see no use in actually wasting either space or volume, just because you happen to have that available. That is, I think very bad naval engineering! And being a student of that particular profession, you ought to be aware of that, which I'm certain you are.
Lastly, the USN, at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the -60s weren't sure exactly how to combat an increasing Soviet submarine force threat. Mind you, BB1987s ship is depicted as of 1976; when the USN had plenty of escorts afloat, and a policy, advocated by Adm. Arleigh Burke of wide zone perimeter defense of the CVBGs and other task forces. It was a return to Cdrs. Roscoe C. MacFall and Chester W. Nimitz' proposals already made in the 1920s to concentrate the carriers (or battleships in that day!) within a circular-patterned chain of destroyers and cruisers; albeit now extended both to littoral warfare, and BBGs. So, in other words, the proposal to install sonars in the CVA-66-67 were misdirected attempts to secure this perimeter. Soon enough it was realized that the carrier should not be diverted at all in its main task; to obtain that air superiority necessary to strike at the enemy. In fact, though the first three vessels of the Kitty Hawk-class were also equipped with the long-range Terrier, it was quickly realized, too, that it wasn't an optimal solution; hence why the JFK received, instead the Mk25 SeaSparrow.