Shipbucket

Italo-Swiss Relations

Into 1941 Switzerland maintained itself on a war footing, with attention focused now on Italian aggression rather than German. Mussolini, like Hitler, had made no secret of his desire to expand into the Cantons, and the speed and success of the Italian invasion of Yugoslavia had brought Swiss defensive planning to a higher level of alertness. But as the conquered territories of the former Yugoslavia rapidly descended into vendetta-driven chaos, the Italian army found itself to be committed into action against a kaleidoscope of combatant forces; Chetnik guerrillas, communist insurgents, ethnic and religious militias, who often were more interested in their own internecine feuds than open warfare with the invaders. The Swiss concluded that the Italians’ rapid success in Yugoslavia was a result of that county’s disunity, and that their own defence on the ground would be much more robust in the event of an assault, as long as the Swiss Air Force could hold back any aerial armada. Confident in their army, the Swiss now prioritised more resources into military aviation.

Pre-war Italy

From his initial ascension to power Mussolini had expounded a dream of a new Roman Empire, "of an empire stretching from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Strait of Hormuz", but at the same time acknowledging Italy’s entrapment by geography and historical geopolitics "Italy will not truly be an independent nation so long as she has Corsica, Bizerta, Malta as the bars of her Mediterranean prison and Gibraltar and Suez as the walls."
Italy had come late to the table as a European colonial power, and had taken control of a bleak stretch of Red Sea Coast as Eritrea in the late 1880’s, and captured Libya from the Ottomans in the war of 1912. As the last region of the African continent free from colonial rule Italy saw the Horn of East Africa as suitable for Italian expansion without interference by the other European powers, and incursions and even outright invasions were mounted against the independent kingdom of Abyssinia. But even against the native army of Abyssinia the army of Italy was humiliated at the Battle of Adwa in 1896, the most significant loss for a European colonial army in Africa, and dreams for Italian East Africa remained unfulfilled into the 1930’s.
As Germany came to be seen as a growing threat to European stability, both Britain and France courted Italy to provide more political pressure against German irredentism. By 1935 France had agreed to give Italy a free hand in Africa in return for Italian co-operation in Europe against Nazi Germany. This bore fruit with the joint British-French-Italian declaration of the Stresa Summit declaring the commitment to upholding stability "in Europe", which Mussolini understood now allowed Italy to claim Ethiopia in return.
However the transfer of Italian troops to Eritrea and Italian Somaliland was no secret, and caused considerable consternation in Britain. As the Italians had broken the British naval codes, the Italians were of the opinion that for their bluster the British were not prepared to go to war with Italy over the upcoming invasion. Hitler saw the rift as the opportunity to split Italy away from the Anglo-French, hoping that Britain would attempt to impose sanctions on Italy, and allowing Germany to offer its “good services” to an isolated Italy.
International reaction to the invasion was ineffective and in reality announced the collapse of the League Of Nations as an sort of effective body. Domestically the invasion was met with great popularity in Italy, with Mussolini riding a wave of Italian nationalistic fervour. League sanctions had been imposed, but with the public revelation of the Hoare-Laval Pact Anglo-French opposition to Italy was seen to be more of a flimsy pretence than moral righteousness. Within 8 months the sanctions were removed and the Italian conquest of Abyssinia was recognised by most nations. Italy had exerted itself as a major power, and had stared down and beaten the League, and Italy’s allegiance now shifted from the Western Powers towards Germany.
With the start of the Spanish Civil war in 1936, Italy formed a volunteer corps and within weeks troops were in Spain assisting Franco’s Nationalist cause. Immediately deployed were Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 transport/bombers and volunteer soldiers. The Italian force increased until in excess of 78,000 men, 7,000 vehicles and 800 aircraft had been deployed, and the eventual Nationalist success in the war was due in no small part to the presence of the Italians.



Having assisted in installing a government beholden to Italy came at price though. Italy had squandered large amounts of materiel, admittedly most outdated by 1939, and spent almost 20% of its national expenditure on prosecuting the war. Italian bombers had been responsible for a sustained bombing campaign against cities and civilians, and the Italian navy had been conducting unrestricted submarine warfare. In response Italy was no longer welcome amongst the nations, leaving the League in 1937, and moving into a closer relationship with Nazi Germany.

Italy After Hitler’s War

Italy and Germany had signed the Pact of Steel in May 1939, joining both countries in a counterbalance to the British and French alliance. Mussolini, however, maintained Italian neutrality into Hitler’s War. With the halting of the panzers and the subsequent anti-Hitler coup, Mussolini found his strategy vindicated, and found himself as the strongman in the power vacuum of southern Europe, leading to the forming of the Tripartite Pact and the Italian-led invasion of Yugoslavia. Now riding the crest of a populist wave in Italy Mussolini cast his gaze outwards again, leaving the details of the Italian commitment to the occupation of the former Yugoslavia to be dealt with by accountants and bureaucrats. With the British possessions of Gibraltar, Malta, Suez and Cyprus (and now Greece) slicing horizontally through the map of the Mediterranean, and the French defensive line of Toulon, Corsica and Bizerta cut vertically through the Italian sealanes to the Atlantic, the possibility of Italian expansion and even international trade, was at the whim of those great Powers. Post-war France was still rapidly rearming itself while locked behind its own borders in a neo-medieval fortress, and Britain was now reasserting its imperial presence in Greece. Even Mussolini’s optimism for Italian military prowess could understand that direct military confrontation with either Power in their new-found strengths would not end well for Italy.
Instead Italy looked to weaken the British position in a continuation of its programme of clandestine warfare, fomenting and supporting discontent in the British possessions, while continuing its own economic and military buildup.

Italian Production of the DB 601 Engine

Into the early 1940’s Italy’s fighter aircraft were something of an outlier to global trends. Italian doctrine still supported the concept of the biplane, even though all other nations had come to the conclusion that the greater speed possible in a monoplane outweighed the tight-manoeuvring ability of a biplane. And the Italian pilots’ desire for “wind in their faces” led to manufacturers being forced to modify fighters to be fitted with open cockpits, rather than the enclosed cockpits that were becoming a necessity with more complex aircraft.
But the biggest weakness to Italian aircraft design was the lack of a suitable engine in the 1000hp class, a technological problem faced by most of Europe in the late 1930’s. The problem was not one of lack of manufacturers, but rather that radial engine designs being developed were just not progressing as rapidly as needed in the atmosphere of the global rearmament race.
In an attempt to negotiate this bottleneck, in 1939 Italy had obtained the licensing rights for production of the DB 601Aa export variant of the successful Daimler Benz V12 engine. With the post-Hitler purchase of the Graf Zeppelin and the associated Bf 109T fighters the construction of the engines, which had been languishing, received addition resources and commenced production in quantity as the RA 1000 RC.41, with both Alfa Romeo and Fiat. Italian manufacturers immediately jumped onto the new engine for fighter aircraft, particularly to replace the mediocre radial engines they had otherwise been using.
Rather than designing new aircraft around the new engine, every manufacturer instead took the low-risk, rapid-production path and modified their aircraft to fit the new profile of the V12 engine, producing updated models rather than new aircraft. The first to fly was the Fiat CR.42DB, which quickly revealed itself as the fastest biplane ever built. Fitted with the 4-gun armament of the CR.42ter, the DB version was granted an immediate order for 150 aircraft, becoming the first of the next generation of Italian fighters.



In the background Macchi had already been working on 2 re-engined models of the C.200 Saetta, the C.201 fitted with the Fiat A.76 R.C.40 engine, and the C.202 with the DB 601 engine. The Fiat radial engine was another troublesome design and was cancelled, dooming the C.201. With design work starting before local production of the DB engine, Macchi privately bought and imported a DB 601 engine to build their prototype. Both the C.201 and C.202 prototypes flew in August 1940, and the C.202 was received with enthusiasm by the test pilots and ordered into production. While an excellent performer in flight, the integral structure of the aircraft was more complex than its contemporaries, and so production of each aircraft required significantly more manhours than completing designs, leading to a slow rate of production.
Reggiane had originally failed to attract Italian interest with their Re.2000 Falco, mainly due to the internal fuel tank arrangement of the wings. Foreign sales, most notably to Britain, had allowed the design to progress and given Reggiane engineers time to rework the design to allow it to be represented to the Regia Marina as a ship-board fighter to replace the Bf 109T’s on Italy’s new aircraft carriers. The fitment of the new DB engine solved the other major shortcoming for the Re.2000 – that of its weak Piaggio P.XI engine. Branded as the Re.2001 the new design was a more significant change to the original aircraft that that of Macchi’s fighter, as the redesign of the wing to accommodate a more conventional fuel tanks structure rather than the original “wet-wing” design was a significant task – as Bristol engineers found with their parallel work to create the Falcon Mk.II. Additionally the whole of the fuselage was reworked to become more aerodynamic, this work effectively delayed the entry into service of the Re.2001, with aircraft only reaching squadron service with both the Regia Aeronautica and Regia Marina six months after the C.202.

Italian Carrier Fighters

The Graf Zeppelin was sold with a complement of Bf 109T fighters and Fi 167 torpedo bombers, and Italian crews used the 2 types to develop procedures and doctrine for carrier operations for the now renamed Aquilla, and Italy’s upcoming second carrier. The production of local aircraft for operational use was a requirement though, and the Regia Marina looked to Italian designs for potential carrier aircraft. A requirement had already been issued for a fighter capable of being launched by catapult from Italian battleships (not being a floatplane the aircraft would have been capable of single use only) and this requirement was now extended to include an alternate mode of operations from a carrier. As the Aquila’s elevator system was designed for the Bf 109T without folding wings, the acceptance of a replacement carrier fighter also without a wing folding mechanism was considered acceptable and would minimise development time.
The Regia Marina had started from the Re.2000 Catapultabile as the battleship fighter, and the project now changed to become the carrier fighter with the ability to also be catapult-launched, now based on the upcoming Re.2001. Three early production Re.2001’s were diverted to the programme, receiving additional strengthening to the landing gear and fuselage to accept the forces generated during ship-board operations.

Italian Ground Attack Aircraft

From fielding a capable ground-attack component during the Spanish Civil War, Italian designers seemed to hit a brick wall and absolutely failed to be able to produce a modern dive-bomber or attack aircraft in the build-up to Hitler’s War. The problem was not one of creating designs, but rather being able to translate the designs into machines that lived up to the requirements.
In 1936 Savoia-Marchetti broke from their work on airliners and large bombers to develop a twin-engined dive bomber, the SM.85. First flying in 1938, the aircraft was underpowered and poorly performing, but hopeful that its performance issues could be worked on and it was ordered into production. However the aircraft was fundamentally aerodynamically flawed, being prone to uncontrollable spins, and was withdrawn. Italy was forced to purchase Junkers Ju 87’s from Germany.
In 1939 a requirement for another attempt at a dive-bomber was issued, with Piaggio supplying a twin-engined design, and Breda and Caproni providing single-engined models. The Piaggio P.122 did not leave the drafting board, but both the Breda Ba.201 and Caproni Ca.355 were built as prototypes. Both failed to provide superior performance to the Stuka, and neither progressed further. Instead Italy pursued a stop-gap policy of adapting fighters to carry a small bombload.
The twin-engined light bombers had developed through the families of the Caproni Ca.310 series and by the time of Hitler’s War were no longer suitable as frontline aircraft. Caproni had initiated work on a new all-metal tactical reconnaissance light bomber in 1938, and the prototype of the Ca.331 O.A. first flew at the end of August 1940. Performance with the initial combination of Isotta Fraschini Delta IV engines and Piaggio propellers was underwhelming, and the design appeared to be another deadend.
At the same time a second reconnaissance bomber was being designed by CANSA, the FC.20. Even while the initial prototype was in construction the mission for the aircraft was changed, and with the success of British airborne heavy cannons on ground targets, the FC.20 was redirected into the dedicated ground attack role. The first prototype reconnaissance aircraft flew in April 1941 and was used for aerodynamic testing, while the second aircraft was built with a redesigned front section carrying a 37mm Breda cannon.



With Italian military aviation suffering from a lack of modern ground attack aircraft the appearance of a design able to hold its own in a modern conflict was greeted with production contracts, allowing the last of the Spanish Civil War era aircraft to finally be retired.

Savoia Marchetti Medium Bombers

From being primarily a seaplane company in the 1920’s Savoia Marchetti had changed focus into the 1930’s and transitioned to producing airliners and bombers, and had become one of Europe’s leading producers of large aircraft. Starting with the S.71 3-engined airliner of 1931 Savoia Marchetti produced a very successful family of 3 and 4 engined aircraft that formed the backbone of the Italian military’s transport and medium bomber fleets. By the time of the Italian invasion of Yugoslavia almost 600 SM.79’s were in service with the Regia Aeronautica, and the aircraft overshadowed Italy’s other medium bomber the Fiat BR.20, which had less than 200 aircraft in 4 bomber wings. The decision to not use the SM.79’s in Yugoslavia due to the risk of friendly fire accidents was unpopular with the SM.79 squadrons, but allowed the BR.20’s to have their final operational glory, as had been demonstrated by Japan in 1938, the BR.20 was highly vulnerable to fighter attacks. In fact as early 1930’s era aircraft both the BR.20 and SM.79 were heading towards obsolescence by 1941.
Savoia Marchetti had proposed a revised model of the SM.79 as the SM.79bis in 1939, and an order for almost 200 aircraft had been placed before the first aircraft, retitled now as the SM.84, first flew in June 1940. Performance of the new model was surprisingly mediocre, with little improvement in speeds over the SM.79, but the increase in bombload, armament and armour led to the order for the phasing out of SM.79 “Sparrowhawk” production in favour of the SM.84 “Goshawk”.



But the venerable SM.79 proved itself a better platform for torpedo bombing, and so many gained a new lease of life as they remained in service to operate in maritime patrol roles, while the SM.84’s took over the bomber tasks.
As the SM.84 was being designed, a design competition for a “Bombardieri Normali” had been initiated. The eventual winning programme had been the Breda Ba.99, but on awarding a development contract Breda had pulled out claiming that due to other commitments they were unable to produce the aircraft. Instead SM’s contender, the SM.89, was ordered. The SM.89 and SM.84 were 2- and 3-engined versions of the same design, and so development of the two types went hand in hand and progressed rapidly. The major work specific to the SM.89 was working on the engine installation, as both aircraft were basically the same from the firewalls and cockpit aft, but also due to the overlap of mission of the two models work on the SM.89 was soon reduced to a low priority.
With the stopping of the panzers in France the SM.89 was now considered as a mount for large ground attack cannons, and work recommenced in earnest with the SM.89’s mission now refocussed as a low-level attacker rather than an altitude bomber. A single prototype was built, but the base SM.84’s mediocre performance was revealed as even less inspiring in the SM.89. By the end of 1941 the SM.89 was determined to be uneconomical to further develop into a production standard while the smaller FC.20bis was entering service. The sole SM.89 remained as a testbed for heavy ground attack weapons.

CANT Medium Bombers

In 1939 the Italian plan to field a force of 3000 aircraft led to a request for a new modern all metal medium bomber to replace the wood-framed aircraft then in use. CANT submitted a metal version of its new 3-engined Z.1007, which had not even entered service yet, as the Z.1015. Unsatisfied with the load factoring of the design, the Regia Aeronautica required that it be significantly strengthened, which would lead to a dramatic weight increase and performance loss. Instead CANT reworked the design to use only 2 higher powered engines allowing lower weight, simpler maintenance and lower unit cost. To prove the design a prototype was ordered, and in typical Italian style the prototype was significantly different to the planned production aircraft. The prototype was flying by October 1939, but the test programme was slow mainly due to the unreliability of the original Alfa Romeo 135 RC.32 engine, still only in development itself. With a change to Piaggio P.XII RC.35 engines the aircraft performed well, but battled against an Italian command nervous over the aircraft being only a twin-engined design as opposed to the more accepted 3-engine style.
Eventually after 12 months of testing an order was placed for 100 aircraft at the end of October 1940, but the transition from a wooden to an all-metal construction line at CANT meant production was slow. To try and rectify this poor start, Filippo Zappata and his design team transferred to Breda in May 1941 to initiate another construction line there. Breda had a strong history of metal aircraft construction, and with the abject failure of the Ba.88 were underutilised and needing a project to resurrect their reputation. Breda’s construction of the CANT Z.1018 progressed rapidly, and quickly overtook CANT, even with their headstart.



The original plan for the Z.1018 had been for a family of bomber models with differing wing inner sections to give greater fuel or altitude capacity, or greater speed. Zappata’s team continued that work now at Breda, reworking the design as the Breda BZ.300-series with high altitude bomber, torpedo bomber and ground attack models proposed.

Piaggio Heavy Bombers

Piaggio had specialised in large bombers from their P.16 of 1934. Designs progressed through the P.23 and the P.23R racer to the P.32 bomber and the Caproni Ca.405 racer. The P.32 enjoyed moderate success with 28 aircraft entering service, but typically for the time the advanced aircraft was let down by the lack of a suitably powerful engine for the designed sleek wings, and by the end of 1939 the aircraft had all been retired. Following on from the P.32, Piaggio enlarged the design to become a four-engined bomber as the P.50. In initial form the aircraft mounted both pusher and puller engines in a low-drag configuration, while the third prototype featured Piaggio radial engines in a more familiar all tractor arrangement.



In 1939 the Italian Air Ministry required a new heavy bomber, and although the CANT Z.1014 was the favoured design Piaggio slashed their purchase price and were awarded the contract for the developed version of the P.50, the P.108B. The first prototype flew in November 1939, and production aircraft had entered squadron service by the time of the invasion of Yugoslavia. The aircraft were all formed into a single “secret” unit, the 274th Squadron, commanded by Bruno Mussolini, the son of Il Duce. The aircraft were a significant advance in Italian bomber technology and were a handful for new crews, and so creation of a training plan and development of operational tactics meant that the P.108’s were unready to play any role in the action in Yugoslavia.
With the failure to secure licence construction of the Boeing 307 Stratoliner for trans-Atlantic services, Piaggio looked to the P.108 design to also become a pressurised airliner. As airliner pressurisation was a new frontier in aircraft design, Piaggio adapted a cancelled light bomber project as a flying testbed, that took to the air in April 1940 as the P.111. While the P.108C airliner project was soon cancelled, the P.111 was to become a vital tool in Piaggio’s programme to build a world-spanning airliner.

Nice progress of this AU.