Shipbucket

Italian Advance On Šibenik

As the Italian column pushed out from Zara they faced intermittent contact with the tail-end of the Yugoslav redeployment to Šibenik. Although none of the engagements were in any way a serious threat to the Italian force which greatly outnumbered the defenders, the Italians demonstrated the excessive caution that had become their unofficial operational doctrine on the ground in the campaign. So lethargic was the advance that contact with the defences at Šibenik was only made in the late afternoon of the 29th at the Krka river at Skradin.
As a port with priority for Italian use after hostilities, Šibenik had been ordered to be spared aerial attacks on infrastructure. Fighter sweeps from bases on the Italian mainland had become a regular occurrence, and every vessel and transport vehicle spotted by the Italian pilots had been destroyed, but care had been taken to not damage the harbour or facilities. The seaplanes of the Hydroplane command had also taken loses, and surviving aircraft had been pulled back down the coast to Split, and flew reconnaissance flights from there.
In the time available the defenders had prepared adequate defences in the rugged countryside in the northern approaches to the city. However Šibenik had been the starting point for the Italian-led agitation that had been the trigger that Italy had used to initiate the conflict. While this meant that the local Coastal Defence Command units were at full readiness even before the invasion, a number of agitators and Italian agents were already embedded in the city. Although outright acts of sabotage had not occurred, acts of petty obstruction had made the preparations for defence more difficult.
The Krka marked a significant barrier to further movement south, as the steep gorges of the deep river were hazardous to cross, and easy to defend from the southern banks. The Yugoslavs had destroyed all bridges and set up a chain of gun posts overlooking the river gorge, a simple defence that would make any river crossing a bloodbath.
During the night of the 29th/30th attempts to land small parties across the river in several locations were met with withering fire and no success. To break the impasse air support was requested for the morning, and after sunrise sweeps by Macchi C.200’s along the southern banks were able to neutralise the defenders. With the Yugoslav threat removed an initial defensive cordon was soon established on the southern bank and Italian engineers constructed temporary bridging to allow the column to press on towards Šibenik.

Hungarian Assault

From the start of the Italian attack on Sunday morning, both Hungarian and Yugoslav border guards had intermittently exchanged fire, with neither side knowing whether their countries were actually in conflict or not. The delay in assault was not down to Hungary remaining neutral in the fight, rather that the Hungarians were not able to have their troops mobilised and ready at the same speed as their allies. Finally on Wednesday 30th April 1941 the situation was clarified, when Horthy issued a declaration at noon stating that Hungary would act to "protect the Hungarians who live in the south parts from the anarchy" of the Italian invasion of Yugoslavia, but by the time the declaration had been made Hungarian troops were already in action in Yugoslavia. Hungary’s war aims were solely to return the territories of Međimurje and Prekmurje in their west, and Bačka and Baranja to their south, and so Hungarian army units were only deployed in those areas.
To the south, the Hungarian 3rd Army crossed the frontier in a two-pronged advance on Novi Sad, with the 11th Infantry Brigade moving through the uncompleted border fortifications towards Osijek, and the rest of the Army advancing on Subotica. In the west the 1st Army crossed the Mur River at Letenye, moving north for Maribor. Facing the Hungarians defending Subotica and Novi Sad was the Yugoslav 1st Army, while the in the vicinity of Osijek the 30th Infantry Division of the 2nd Army was still in the process of deploying.
The delay in Hungary’s entry into the conflict had led the misapprehension that both Hungary and Romania were not going to be belligerents, and so the Yugoslav 1st Army Commanders started to withdraw to aid the defence of Belgrade. The Hungarian main force rapidly captured Subotica, pushing aside the border guards who were the only resistance.
But, in contrast to most of the rest of the country, the Yugoslav Air Force units in the northeast had not suffered from the heavy air attacks that had crippled the force, and Blenheim light bombers from 61st and 62nd Bomber Groups scrambled from their dispersal fields at Bijeljina to interdict the advancing Hungarians. The Hungarians had not mounted pre-emptive air strikes before their advance, but provided a defensive air cover of Reggiane Re.2000 fighters.



In the skies over Subotica the Hungarian fighters and Yugoslav light bombers fought an indecisive engagement with no ground support to either side. Both the Yugoslavs and the Hungarians lost a single aircraft in the low-level melee, but the mission of the Blenheims was to hamper the Hungarian advance and having no effect on the ground battle below them, the Yugoslavs failed in their task.

Hungarian Paratroops In Action

Hungary was one of the few countries that had created a significant elite force of paratroopers, and so a specific mission to utilise their talents had been devised to be a part of the initial assault into Yugoslavia. With the ground assault south requiring the use of Yugoslav bridges, the 1st Parachute Battalion were to be deployed forward to capture the strategic canal bridges at Srbobran and Vrbas, and prevent their destruction by retreating Yugoslav forces.
Using the Savoia-Marchetti SM.75’s that had been impressed from the Hungarian airline MALERT, the paratroops left their home field as the ground forces crossed the frontier. Providing cover were WM-23 in their first combat deployment, commanded by the Hungary’s Deputy Regent István Horthy.
Penetrating south past Subotica, the Hungarian paratrooper force were intercepted by the Yugoslav 34th Fighter Group, flying freshly upgraded LVT-1’s. The Yugoslav’s dived to intercept, while the Hungarian fighters rose to defend in an aerial battle that neither side had a significant advantage in. However the LVT-1’s revealed the intrinsic advantage of the LVT-1’s tube and fabric fuselage, with the WM-23’s cannons only poking holes through the fabric, while the Yugoslav guns were able to cause greater damage to the plywood skinned Hungarian fighters.



The SM.75’s were airliners locally modified to become military transports, fitted with dorsal turrets and a ventral dustbin turret. With their structures not being designed for the stresses of combat they were suitable for a secondary military role, but lacking in capability as an assault transport. With the SM.75's holding formation as they tracked towards their drop point several LTV-1’s broke through the defensive fighter screen and struck at the transports. Heavily laden with troops and their equipment the SM.75’s were not able to endure much damage, and the number 4 aircraft dropped out of formation with its left engine smashed and burning. Unable to jump the paratroopers were trapped inside and perished as the aircraft’s wing failed in flight.



Although they had lost 20% of their force the Hungarian paratroopers found their objectives in a state of disorganisation. The Yugoslav 1st Army forces were in disorder as they were attempting to redeploy south to assist in the defence of Belgrade and were in no position to coordinate their own defence, let alone demolish the bridges. Facing only token resistance, the Hungarian paratroopers rapidly secured their objectives and found themselves struggling to deal with the first mass surrender of Yugoslav soldiers.

Italian Advances In The North

Having neutralised and bypassed Sušak, on the morning of the 30th April Italian troops split into a force headed northeast towards Zagreb to link with the column moving from Ljubljana, and a smaller force advancing down the coast to take the Yugoslav naval station at Selce.
After having broken through the initial Yugoslav defences around Sušak the Italians found the hilly countryside slow to traverse as they moved northwards for Zagreb, but resistance had melted away as the calls for Croat liberation under the Italians found fertile ground amongst the rural populace. Likewise pushing southeast from Ljubljana the Italian motorised column faced only minimal resistance as northern Yugoslavia collapsed into anarchy. Yugoslav soldiers turned on their officers and mutinied against Belgrade, while other units just disolved and disappeared into the hills. Meanwhile formerly peaceful villages had neighbours turn against each other because of ethnic rivalries dating back to the Middle Ages.
Along the Dalmatian coast the Italians faced their only strong opposition in the north, where approaching Šibenik the Italians found themselves facing machine gun pits and trenches manned by a Yugoslav foe determined to hold against the invaders.

Yugoslav Raid On Brindisi

While in retreat down the northern coast, in the south the Maritime Air Force was still conducting offensive actions. Expecting a naval assault on the Bay of Kotor, the Dornier Do J reconnaissance elements had been mounting scouting west into the Adriatic to monitor Italian shipping movements. By the morning of 30th April no Italian activity other than that expected for the supply of materiel into Albanian ports had been detected, and so tactics were changed for an attack that evening on the port of Brindisi.
In the afternoon 3 Dornier Do 22Kj’s were prepared for a bombing raid, supported by the 3 Rogožarski R-313’s armed as fighter-bombers. Flying together the six aircraft arrived at Brindisi at dusk without having been detected. The Italian harbour defences provided a formidable barrage of anti-aircraft fire, but with the aircraft attacking at low-level their fire was inaccurate and ineffective. Both the Dornier’s and the R-313’s dropped their 100kg bombs over the harbour, hitting ships and facilities. Having struck the aircraft departed east in the gathering gloom, vanishing before Italian aircraft could intercept them.



The raid caused only minor damage, but was a major shock to the Italian command, it was not considered that the Yugoslav’s would have still been able to mount an action of this kind. The hope had been that the facilities at the Bay of Kotor would be captured undamaged, and so no infantry push in that direction had been planned. It was now determined that a ground assault from Albania must be mounted to collapse the resistance of the Yugoslavia coastal defence.

Bulgarian Advance

Just as Fall Gelb could be seen as Germany re-fighting the Schlieffen Plan of the Great War, Bulgaria’s battle plan in Yugoslavia was a similar repeat of the 2nd Bulgarian Army in the Serbian Campaign of 1915.
After their initial advance past the border towards Skopje, the Bulgarian troops had faced stiff resistance from the Yugoslav 3rd Territorial Army as their advance had pushed into the deploying Yugoslav units. The attack along this axis was not through preprepared defensive positions though, and so the use of Bulgarian PZL.43’s for targeted airstrikes was not very effective against the defenders firing from shallow foxholes amongst the trees. But against overwhelming numbers and with no air support of their own the Yugoslav’s were slowly pushed back, and by the evening of the 28th the Bulgarian forces had advanced through the heaviest of the hill country and captured the village of Ginovci. By day three of the assault, the crumbling 3rd Territorial Army was no longer an effective fighting force , while to their north the 5th Army had deployed against a potential attack from northern Bulgaria which had not occurred. Facing minimal resistance Kumanovo was captured on the 30th April.
The advance from Tsarevo Selo met with less Yugoslav resistance with the local units were still in their mobilisation and unprepared for a coherent defence against the assault. But the terrain was even more inhospitable to a motorised advance than that travelled by the Bulgarian northern thrust, and progress was slow. By the evening of the 28th the Bulgarian column had only advanced as far as Vinica, where they regrouped in preparation for a push down the more favourable farmland of the Kočani Valley. Although a defence was made at Shtip it became no more than a delay to the Bulgarian’s advance across the open country of the Ovče Pole, and by the 30th had pushed through Sveti Nikole on the road to Skopje.
The Bulgarian southern assault met only weak resistance once the border fortifications were breached, and although this push was through the Strumica River valley rather than hill country, the Bulgarians found themselves mired in mud and minefields. The advance had only achieved 10 kms by nightfall on the 27th. Early on the 28th the Yugoslavian 21st Infantry Regiment mounted a counter attack from the hills to the north of Shushitsa. The Bulgarians had stayed in the valley and had not probed into the hills, and were taken by surprise while they were in the process of reforming to advance again. Although heavily outnumbered the Yugoslav’s mounted a spirited attack with the aim of blunting and delaying the advance, rather than repelling the invaders. Unexpectedly the Yugoslavian soldiers found themselves supported by 2 Dornier Do 17’s who were independently hitting targets of opportunity from their isolated dispersal airstrips.
Having delivered their warloads the Dornier’s left the battle, and the Bulgarian ground forces soon regained their composure and rallied. With the tide of battle turning, the Yugoslavian troops started pulling back and disengaged from combat and disappeared back into the wooded hills. Too late to effect the skirmish, Bulgarian air support arrived as the Bulgarian column was reforming and the fighters merely flattened the church of Saint George overlooking Shushitsa and shattered Yugoslavian trees, but the 21st Infantry Regiment had already dispersed.
With better conditions and no significant resistance Strumica fell that afternoon, and after consolidating their position in the town the Bulgarian column headed back into the hills to their south to take the site of the historic Bulgarian victory of Kosturino, and closing the Greek border at Gevgelija.
The Yugoslavian defence against the Bulgarians had rapidly collapsed on all axes, with Kavadarci captured on the 30th, as the Bulgarian southern and central columns prepared to unite and assault Skopje. With pressure now on Skopje, Bulgarian bombers attacked the city, striking the civilian population rather than specific military targets.

Italian Push North

Having thinly spread the whole of the Yugoslavian 3rd Army along the whole of the Albanian border there was no possibility for defence in depth, even if the Yugoslavians had have had the time to be fully mobilised. Once the initial defensive line had been breached at Prizren there was little hope of the Yugoslavians managing to hold the Italian advance. Pulling back to reinforce Pristina the 31st Infantry were given a brief interlude though as the Italian force spread to secure all of Metohija before continuing their thrust north.
The Italians advance into Metohija was largely met without resistance, however the Komski Cavalry Detachment had sent a squad eastwards from Andrijevica to reconnoitre the flatlands east of the Accursed Mountains. Although not a significant fighting force, the Yugoslav cavalrymen ambushed the initial Italian probe into Peja before pulling back into the mountains. Unable, and unwilling, to follow into the Rugova Canyon Italian troops instead created a defensive position at Peja to secure the town from any further Yugoslav advance from the mountains.
By the morning of the 29th the Italian forces were confident in their securing of their lodgement, and launched probing attacks against Pristina. Having had breathing space to prepare, the 31st Infantry mounted a spirited defence of the outskirts of the city, although the Yugoslav’s were without heavy weapons and so were unable to combat the Italian armour and air power. Relying now on their air force to soften defended positions rather than committing ground forces, the Italian army now held back while air attacks broke Yugoslavian opposition. Only late in the afternoon did Italian troops enter a burning Pristina.
With the Yugoslav southern defences now breached and with no cohesive military formations to their south, the military command in Belgrade desperately attempted to order the as yet unblooded formations along the Hungarian and Romanian borders south to fight back against the Bulgarian and Italian thrusts. On the evening of the 29th, the Yugoslav 1st and 2nd Armies started to leave their positions along the quiet Hungarian border and started moving south towards Belgrade. The Yugoslav 5th Army was deployed along the likewise calm Romanian border and down to the northern half of the Bulgarian border. Expecting an additional attack from northern Bulgaria the 5th Army were still in their defensive positions, guarding the border and facing no more than pot-shots from Bulgarian border guards. The 5th Army had now been bypassed and found itself with its rear open and exposed and with concerns more for defending itself from encirclement than for redeploying to defend Belgrade.



By the 1st of May the Italian advance was facing almost no organised resistance and had captured Mitrovica and the rail line to Belgrade, and continued northwards.

Hungarian Advance

With the Yugoslav 1st Army conducting a tactical withdrawal the Hungarian 3rd Army was able to advance against minimal resistance through Subotica and the 1st and 2nd Motorised Brigades were able to use one of Yugoslavia’s best roads to reach Novi Sad and the Danube, the southern extent of their claim on Yugoslavian Bačka.



The Hungarian 11th Infantry Brigade advanced through the uncompleted border fortifications by the Danube and were able to rapidly advance to Osijek. Hungarian air power had broken the only significant resistance from the Yugoslav 30th Divisional Cavalry Battalion, and the Hungarian ground forces found themselves greeted as liberators rather than invaders by the civil populace. Along the Hungarian border the Yugoslav army had collapsed with mutinies against their Serbian officers, and town officials had pledged support to the independence of Croatia.
In the north Prekmurje had already rebelled against Yugoslavia, with the local Volksdeutsche minority having formed self-defence militias and taken the surrender of some local Yugoslav troops. Hoping for German liberation from Serbia rather than Italo-Hungarian, these militias were no more supportive of the Hungarian army than they were of the Yugoslavian. The Hungarian motorised troops advanced westwards along the Drava River initially without resistance, while as soon as they attempted to advance north along the Drava they found themselves facing the hostile militias with their captured Yugoslav weapons, and small contingents of Yugoslav loyalist troops who had evaded the militias.



With the collapse of the Yugoslav military in the region, the Hungarians assumed that they would be able to walk in and fill the void, and instead they faced their stiffest opposition in the campaign from civilians. The Hungarian advance faltered at Ormož at the pinchpoint on the Drava and at Mursko Središće on the Mur.

Attack On Kotor

With Queen Elena of Italy being herself a Montenegrin, in fact a daughter of the last Montenegrin monarch Nicholas I, King of Italy Victor Emmanuel III had demanded of Mussolini the creation of an independent Montenegro after the conquest of Yugoslavia. A part of that requirement had been that the Montenegrin people be spared from military action, and the Italian ground offensive had planned to be north from Albania, with no thrust into Montenegro. Now with the need to neutralise the Yugoslav naval base at the Bay of Kotor to protect the Italian mainland, thoughts of leaving the facilities there intact for their post-war use were forgotten, and an aerial bombardment of the Bay authorised.
With almost no defensive airpower for protection the seaplanes of the Hydroplane Commands had been alternating between using Kotor and Krapanj as refuelling and maintenance facilities, while endeavouring to only be on the water at Kotor during the hours of darkness. Most of the naval vessels had been deployed elsewhere with a majority attempting to defend the northern Dalmatian coast, but the Yugoslav destroyer Zagreb and a contingent of torpedo boats and submarines were still in the Bay, being held in reserve against an Italian naval attack. With Italian fighters mounting regular sweeps across the Bay these vessels were changing their camouflaged locations every night and so far none had been attacked.
Now the regular patrols of the Albanian based Italian fighters changed tactics, with the dawn patrol on Friday 2nd swooping in over the dock facilities and unloaded weapons in a free-for-all. With fires burning a smoke pall started to form over the western portion of the Bay in the morning stillness, prevented from dispersing by the foothills of Mount Orjen. While other Yugoslav military facilities had been suffering under almost a week of aerial assaults, the rescue crews at Kotor now faced their first call to action, and battled to deal with the damage, especially with the naval oil stores ablaze.
But worse was yet to come as soon Italian bombers arrived to complete the destruction of the Yugoslav naval base. With smoke now covering the naval facilities and the neighbouring towns and Italians identified their target by the spreading smoke, and dropped their payload over dockyard and village alike, unleashing the same destruction they had poured on Belgrade.

Depletion Of The Maritime Air Force

With the rise in civil and military unrest by both the Ustaše and other Croat nationalists, attempts by the land units of the Coastal Defence Command to contain the breakouts were sporadic at best, while the Italian navy was not involved in the northern front leaving the Yugoslav naval units only achievement being dodging Italian aircraft.
With remining Yugoslav air force units in action inland, aerial action against the Italian force advancing through Dalmatia was left to the seaplanes of the Maritime Air Force. Not trained to conduct offensive operations of this nature both Dornier Do 22 Kj’s and Rogožarski SIM-XIV-H’s were used in an ad hoc fashion to mount single aircraft attacks on the soft-skinned Italian column travelling south along roads little better than goat tracks. Even without dedicated anti-aircraft capability the Italian’s steadily whittled down the numbers of attacking aircraft without the advance being blunted.
Steadily losing their modern combat aircraft, in an attempt to remain in action outdated Dornier Do D bis aircraft were returned to combat service from their twilight career roles as squadron hacks. Without continuous air support for the advancing Italian troops the slow and poorly defended Dorniers were able to press home their ground attacks, although with the same degree of inaccuracy as their other Hydroplane colleagues. However with their rugged duralumin hulls the Do D bis’s were more able to take damage from Italian groundfire, and although sporting patches over bullet holes, none of the geriatric Dorniers were lost in action.