Somehow it seems wrong to built a new ship based on a hull design which is over 35 years old by that time.
Will be interesting to see the first one hit the water.
I'm curious as to why you say that. The fact is - The hull design works, and works well. Why change what doesn't need changing if the systems still fit?
US Navy plans call for procuring 24 Flight III DDG-51s between FY2016 and FY2031 (aka.
commissioned by 2021-2035, to remain in service until 2060-2075)
The problem ?
Would a Flight III DDG-51 have sufficient growth margin for a projected 35- or 40-year service life ?
Skeptics could argue that there are uncertainties involved in projecting what types of capabilities ships might need to have to remain mission effective over a 35- or 40-year life, and that building expensive new warships with relatively modest growth margins consequently would be imprudent. The Flight III DDG-51’s growth margin, they could argue, could make it more likely that the ships would need to be removed from service well before the end of their projected service lives due to an inability to accept modifications needed to preserve their mission effectiveness. Skeptics could argue that it might not be possible to fit the Flight III DDG-51 in the future with an electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG) or a high-power (200 kW to 300 kW) solid state laser (SSL), because the ship would lack the electrical power or cooling capacity required for such a weapon. Skeptics could argue that EMRGs and/or high-power SSLs could be critical to the Navy’s ability years from now to affordably counter large numbers of enemy anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) that might be fielded by a wealthy and determined adversary. Skeptics could argue that procuring Flight III DDG-51s could delay the point at which EMRGs or high-power SSLs could be introduced into the cruiser-destroyer force, and reduce for many years the portion of the cruiser-destroyer force that could ultimately be backfitted with these weapons. This, skeptics could argue, might result in an approach to AAW and BMD on cruisers and destroyers that might ultimately be unaffordable for the Navy to sustain in a competition against a wealthy and determined adversary.
Some others concerns about Arleigh Burke Flight III
- Main gun: a 127mm/Mk-45 or a newer 155 AGS
(The 155 AGS was much better than the older 5" mount, but infortunatly more bigger = a need to lenghtened the hull by up to 10 meters (if you want to save a number of forward VLS...) = additionnal cost)
- VLS: Mk-41 or the newer MK-57 model (same on DDG 1000 Zumwalt) ?
- Automation problem (140 sailors on the Zumwalt; 240 to 300+ on a Burke's)
For a class (or sub-class
) of Destroyers intended to operate in the 2020's-2060's era, the LATEST technologies are now obligatory:
- AMDR
- 155 AGS
- Mk-57 VLS
- Full UAV/UUV
- Advanced crew reduction (from +/- 260/300 for a Burke to +/- 140/180 sailors on the next generation of destroyers)
The problem is that the current Burke-hull may be too small/ageing
Moreover, designing a enlarged Burke (In fact, similar than the South-Korean "King Sejong the Great class"), this may be as expensive as designing a radically new destroyer.