Cold War Strategic Bomber Challenge

Hello Again!

Lest this challenge is forgotten entirely – let’s wreak some more havoc on the Thiariaverse’s timeline and continuity by presenting the:

MCE B5M Griofa
Thiaria had been prohibited to possess a military aviation branch till 1955; after this ban was lifted, a very quick force buildup was initiated. As the USA was reluctant to provide high-end equipment, most early Thiarian jet fighters were French supplied (Mystere, Super Mystere and Vautour), although Thiaria’s aviation industry quickly started to produce domestic designs. Even though some of them showed considerable promise, their full development and production was so much more expensive than simply buying from the shelf that most domestic projects came to naught; there also was the problem of the lack of suitably powerful jet engines at Thiaria’s disposal. Of the half dozen late 50s designs submitted by Aerelar, Aigeanta and MCE (all of them small private venture short-range aircraft), only the Aigeanta O7T/F7T Tearatoirn jet trainer and light ground support aircraft and the Aerelar T7L Claiomh transonic strike fighter were series produced; the former was even exported to Uruguay, Peru, Ethiopia and later Angola. The latter was developed in a joint venture with North American and resembled the Super Sabre, and this co-operation was to have a lasting effect on further Thiarian designs, as the Thiarian secret service used the opportunity for some industrial espionage and attained details on several newer North American designs, especially the A3J Vigilante. Although they had a colourful mix of fighters, strike-fighters, bombers and ground attack aircraft - Ouragan, Super Mystere, Claiomh, Vautour and Tearatoirn – none of these planes was particularly large, and all had relatively short range. What the Thiarian Air Corps really needed, however, was a fast long range twinjet interceptor, which the French at that time could not offer. Despite their lack of experience, the Thiarians launched a domestic fighter project in 1960, which spawned the very ambitious MCE T4M, built around two SNECMA Atar 9C engines. The T4M, whose designers obviously knew much about the North American A3J, of which this plane was virtually a downscaled carbon copy, was selected for production in 1961. The first prototype had just been rolled out when the Kennedy administration late in 1961 declared its willingness to deliver more modern US airplanes than previously. Some claim that this political shift specifically targeted Thiaria’s aviation industry, which was to be eliminated as a potential export competitor; they are, of course, right. The MCE T4M, which had its first flight on June 5th, 1962, was all a 1960s fighter was supposed to be and easily a match for the McDonnell F-101D which was ultimately purchased by the Thiarian Air Corps. What tipped the scales for the US design was its more modern avionics suite and its much lower price tag. After three prototypes had been tested for two years, the T4M programme was canelled in 1964. As a compensation, MCE was awarded the production license for the second half of the F-101D order, giving the company valuable experience with the Super Voodoo’s integrated fire control system and avionics suite. The J79 engines were subcontracted to CLTI, which quickly presented a series of evolved designs.

With the fighter question solved (for the time being), the Thiarian Air Force then sought a heavy bomber to complement its Vautours. These were relatively short-ranged; the desired heavy bomber was to have the ability to hit targets on mainland South America from bases in mainland Thiaria and to cover the whole South Atlantic all the way to Capetown from Gough or Craigmiadh. A specification issued in 1962 called for 8.000 kilograms of payload to be delivered over a distance of 2.500 kilometers or 3.000 kilograms over 4.000 kilometers (in either case with return ticket), ideally at Mach 2 on a hi-lo-hi mission profile. This was pretty much state of the art at that time and resembled the TFX requirement that spawned the F-111 for the USAF. The Thiarians expressed interest in TFX in 1963; the US government retorted that Thiaria was not that close an ally and needed some more time to earn the necessary trust. They would be willing to deliver B-57s, but nothing more sophisticated. After the Mirage IV – which the French would have been happy to supply – was evaluated, but found too short-ranged, the Thiarian government asked three domestic contractors for designs meeting the 1962 specification, but only MCE submitted a bid. This plane was a linear upscale of the T4M, with the same wing and vertical stabilizer layout, but twinned horizontal stabilizers. At slightly over 29 meters length, the airframe weighed 29.500 kg empty. VG wings were considered superior aerodynamically, but would have added another six tons of weight, which was considered unacceptable given the available powerplant options, so the large A3J-style wings were retained. A crew of three was embarked (pilot and WSO abreast in an F-111 style cockpit, Navigator/Electronics officer behind them, offset to the right); there was no escape capsule, only ordinary ejector seats with increased rocket fuel capacity for longer burning time in order to safely clear the very long hull. A spacious bomb bay was installed amidships, with fuel tanks before and aft; more fuel was carried in the wings. Total internal fuel capacity was nearly 20 tons. The bomb bay could hold eight 1.000-kg dumb bombs; alternatively, twenty-seven 250kg bombs could be loaded. Half the bomb load could be substituted by additional fuel; on the other hand, there was a specially designed 12.000kg conventional bunker-buster bomb, which would fit into the weapons bay and could be hauled at somewhat reduced fuel capacity. No external hard points were provided in order to keep aerodynamics as clean as possible. MTOW was a whopping 58.000 kg. Propulsion was provided by four J79 engines of 48/76 kN thrust. These were arranged on each side of the main hull, two on top of each other, with the exhausts forming a rectangle when viewed from dead aft. Designed top speed was Mach 1,2 at sea level and Mach 2 at optimum height. Steering followed the same unorthodox approach as in the A3J, using flaps and spoilers instead of ailerons, and the plane had an early – if primitive – fly-by-wire steering system. Electronics were simpler than in the earlier A3J; although the Thiarians had complete plans of the Vigilante, their industry was not yet able to reliably reverse-engineer everything, especially not the early digital computers. The proposal was nevertheless impressive overall, and good-looking too, resembling a twin-tailed Vigilante on steroids. The price tag however was astronomic, given the limited numbers required and the even more limited export potential. But Lemuria’s rather sudden coming-out as a major military power, symbolized by its first nuclear test on April 27th, 1964, sufficiently scared Thiaria’s government into approving the construction of two B5M prototypes (and, most secretly, a programme aimed at developing a domestic nuclear weapon) late in 1964.
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By the time the new bomber had its first flight on June 1st, 1968, Soviet military observers were already at large in Thiaria, but the Thiarian Air Corps subverted the new friendship with the Soviets by keeping the B5M a secret from them and conducting initial tests from a remote base in Tir Nimhniuil. Results were very convincing. The B5M had twice the thrust, but only 175% the weight of a RA-5C Vigilante, giving it a relatively good climb rate, and its huge wings with low wing load made it surprisingly maneuverable for its size. Mach 2 was easily secured on the third test flight, and on an all-out run without payload, the B5M achieved Mach 2,35 late in 1969. In low-level flight, the B5M was capable of nearly 1.500 km/h (Mach 1,25), although only over flat terrain. Reliability of the mostly experimental avionics was somewhat shaky, however, and maintenance requirements were enormous. Flight testing continued till late 1971; during that time, the second prototype was fitted with a French Antilope terrain-following radar, enabling it to dodge obstacles in low-level flight, and other avionics improvements were implemented to improve reliability. The nose was slightly shortened to improve ground view from the cockpit. Some structural strengthening also was found necessary, increasing empty weight to 31.500 kg and MTOW to 62.000 kg. By January 1st, 1972, total programme cost approached $ 600M, which was not much for a plane of this size, but still too much for Thiaria’s strained economy to bear. MCE estimated a unit price of $30M if a series of at least 50 production planes was ordered, which was three times the cost of a contemporary F-111F. Thiaria’s left government – which liked the project because it would serve to strengthen the Army (Thiaria’s Air Corps was and is till today no independent arm, but a component of the Army) versus the Navy, whose senior personnel and leadership was suspicious of reactionary tendencies – decided to order a pre-series of 10 machines in April 1972 to keep MCE busy (the company had been nationalized in 1968). By that time, the project was no longer a secret and caused considerable political turmoil: The Russians wanted full access to what was in every respect a better performing plane than any of their own medium bombers and offered 40 Tu-22s in exchange against all 12 B5Ms plus the complete plans. The Americans were outraged about the obvious reason for B5Ms similarity to the Vigilante, and deeply concerned about Thiaria’s acquisition of what they considered a nuclear first-strike platform, not believing Thiaria’s promises not to deploy nuclear weapons. India and some Middle-East countries expressed interest in purchasing the new plane. Thiaria’s government reacted by stalling and making conflicting promises, thereby slowing the programme down, but not terminating it. The pre-series planes – essentially hand-made – needed till 1975 to be delivered to the Air Corps, which assigned all ten machines to a single bomber squadron and officially named the type Griofa (Griffin). Price per unit was $42M at 1972 price levels, which was completely and utterly outrageous. By that time, the 1974 elections had forced the Red Front into a coalition government with Labour, which opposed military spending on general principle and considered the Griofa – with some justification – as the most blatant exercise in waste ever undertaken in Thiarian history. While the Air Corps gained initial operational experience with the B5M and regarded it as an enormously capable piece of equipment, the new government sought ways to ease international tensions, and after heated internal discussions, the B5M was selected as a sacrifice. The Navy’s aircraft carriers, which were just receiving very capable Breguet Orfraie bombers, could do anything the Griofa could do and more, so the reasoning went, thus eliminating the necessity for a long-range land-based heavy bomber. The secret nuke programme, which the Soviets had become aware of, was revealed and cancelled in 1975 before the KGB could spill it as Soviet-Thiarian relations degenerated after Thiaria’s refusal to join OPEC’s oil embargo against the West. Finally, the end of the B5M programme was announced early in 1976. The pre-series machines were to be retained for the time being, but no series production was to occur.
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The single Griofa squadron of the Thiarian Air Corps achieved FOC early in 1977. They were refitted with digital avionics, LANTIRN, FLIR and an internal Laser designator in the early 1980s and could now employ 1.000kg LGBs, of which however only four could be crammed into the weapons bay. They regularly practiced low-level attack runs and received a wrap-around camouflage scheme in 1982. They were also cleared to carry two AM-39 ASMs internally for long-range anti-shipping missions, and their ECM suite was comprehensively upgraded in 1987, at the same time when uprated RT1S engines of 52/80 kN and somewhat better fuel economy were installed.
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In 1990, six machines deployed to Saudi-Arabia for Operation Desert Shield in order to show them off – and an impression they did make, dwarving RAF Tornadoes parked next to them. The large size of their horizontal stabilizers and the arrangement of their engines earned them the nickname ‘X-wings’. They were deafeningly loud, even compared to other warplanes, and their four J79s left smoke trails that made them look as if they were on fire. Apart from that, they worked. During operations against Iraq, they dropped all twenty 12.000 kg bombs in Thiaria’s inventory on Iraqi logistics and communications installations with devastating effect. One Griofa was lost to ground fire; fast as they were, they were huge targets. After the Gulf war, the Griofa was the first Thiarian airplane to introduce the heavy Popeye air-to-ground missile, but the clock was already ticking. In 1994, material fatigue was detected at several crucial joints of the planes; the combination of massive weight and good aerodynamic maneuverability had subjected the airframes to stress levels of unpreceded intensity. As operating costs were still horrendous, they were retired from front-line service in 1995, and their squadron was converted to electronic warfare. Eight of nine survivors were put on display to commemorate one of the most daring achievements in the history of Thiarian engineering; after all, Thiaria had not put into the air anything more sophisticated than a Super Sabre clone when Griofa’s development started, and even afterwards, they would revert to buying foreign types for a long time. Economically, the Griofa was a total disaster, but technically, it yielded one of the most capable bombers of the cold war.

Greetings
GD

Impressive, seems Master Garlic and I were visited by the same muse~

I'm coming back to this little timeline I developed for my previous A17M, which I've resorted into calling Kali Yuga, this time visiting it during a time of actual war. No cheating ships this time, though I think this crate has a lot of potential, so I want to keep doing versions of it from after the war finished.

Nakajima G14N Shirozan

白山

For decades, the land-based bombers of the Imperial Japanese Navy had steadily increased in size and capabilities, culminating in the gigantic mixed powerplant G12N first flown in 1952. In 1958, Captain Ken Fujiwara of the IJAAF was shot down over Galicja by an R7 Riese SAM, while flying a Mitsubishi Ki-274 high altitude reconaissance aircraft at 70,000 ft. Suddenly, high altitude bomber raids over Reich territory had become obsolete, and both the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service and the Greater Japan Empire Army Air Corps scrambled to find new solutions to the strategic bombing problem. Both services had active ballistic missile programs, and the Army was just beginning to deploy its own short range ballistic missile, the Ki-300, albeit still without an appropriate nuclear warhead.
The Navy decided to return to its roots and requested proposals for a medium sized bomber that could serve as both a naval strike platform and a strategic low-level penetrator. The aircraft would have to be supersonic at low altitude and be able to carry the Type 17 Special Device internally. Carriage of the various guided missiles entering navy inventory was also mandated. Strike range was specified as 2,000 km minimum. Such a range imposed an important challenge to designers in an era of thirsty turbojet engines, and various solutions were proposed. The two finalists from Mitsubishi and Nakajima were vastly different. Mitsubishi offered a bomber of 65,000 kg MTOW, powered by four Mitsubishi Ze-621 afterburning turbojets of 53.6 kN dry thrust and 83.3 kN with reheat inside pods below the wing roots. The bomber featured an innovative swing wing system and promised a speed of Mach 1.2 at low level. This aircraft would’ve had a crew of four, been able to carry 9,000kg of ordnance and deliver it with precision at low altitude thanks to the use of a navigation/attack computer associated with terrain following radar and an inertial navigation system still in development.

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Nakajima’s entry was for a much smaller aircraft, of 45,000 kg MTOW, powered by two Kawasaki-Ishikawajima Ze-609 turbojets, a two spool development of the venerable Ze-409 in use by various Navy and Army aircraft. These engines, with a projected thrust of 68.4 kN dry and 96.7 kN with reheat, were still in development and were incredibly thirsty in current tests, but outputted an outstanding ammount of thrust for their size. They were to be backed up by two of the small but powerful Ishikawajima Ze-580s, which outputted 15.5 kN and 22.2kN dry and with reheat respectively, to be used during takeoff and penetration phases. Nakajima believed that by using four smaller engines and shutting down two of them in flight, range could be extended considerably. This aircraft featured a short span swept wing at 42°, with wide chord and pronounced taper, and tail control surfaces of considerable size. It was better adapted to the attack role than the bigger Mitsubishi airframe and featured air intake slots above the fuselage and a robust landing gear for rough field operations. The aircraft eschewed conventional ailerons for full span flaps, roll control being delegated to spoilers further ahead on the wing chord and to the rather large elevators, which could move independently. Twin vertical stabilizers acted as rudders, the whole airfoil being a moving part, and large airbrakes were provided above and below the fuselage. The aircraft sat two in tandem cockpits and also featured a sophisticated nav/attack system with terrain following radar. Nakajima, however, claimed that Toshiba already had an operational inertial navigation system for its aircraft.
The results of the evaluations by the Navy concluded that the swing wing mechanism added risk to Mitsubishi’s offering, and that the Nakajima proposal, while having less range than its competitor, would be far more convenient to acquire and deploy. Nakajima was awarded a contract for three prototypes and sixteen pre-production aircraft on the condition that fuel consumption by the Ze-609s could be reduced by 30%.
The first prototype flew from Ōta, in Gunma, on March 17, 1964, test pilot Kenji Iwamoto at the controls, and was given the G14N designation by the Navy. The aircraft were shipped to Yokosuka Navy Yard for trials and on May 20 it established a new altitude record when Navy Commander Kaneyoshi Abe (Pilot) and Lieutenant Akira Oda (Bombardier/Navigator) took prototype コ-G14-3, carrying a 1,000 kg payload, to Mach 2.5, then pulled up to a ballistic trajectory, passing beyond the actual ceiling the airframe was able to sustain. They reached an altitude of 27,895.3 m. All four engines flamed out, the aircraft rolled on its back and then spun for minutes until it regained control by itself as it entered thicker air.

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The G14N entered operational trials in late 1966, by now called the Type 27 Land-based Attack Aircraft. First deployed to the 763 Kōkūtai based in Ceylon, aircrews accustomed to large bombers which produced plenty of lift had to train extensively in the new aircraft, which was much “hotter”, specially on approach. The local fighter jockeys found it superlatively fast and maneuverable on the deck, and a few of them took to bouncing their colleagues in unofficial and very much prohibited training flights, but being on the fringes of the Sphere allowed for such disregard for protocol from time to time.
Early G14N1 airframes performed superbly on trials. They consistently managed to sustain Mach 1.15 on the deck (limited to 10 minutes due to material temperature concerns) while maintaining a constant 60m altitude over terrain while under autopilot control, thanks to the Type 23 terrain-following radar. Combat radius was established as 1,450 km with only an internal load on a hi-lo-hi profile, but could be increased to 1,800 km by using 2,000l external drop tanks, or 1,930 km by using a bespoke 6,000l fuel tank that fit into the bomb bay. These figures improved in later marks as the Ze-609 became more efficient with subsequent versions. Eventually, combat radius reached 2,500 km with 2,000l external tanks. The aircraft also featured a retractable fuel probe to extend its range via in-flight refuelling.
An unforeseen consequence of the Naval Bomber programme was the Reich’s reaction to their discovery of this aircraft, and the implications this had for future air development. Evaluation aircraft were first spotted by german Zenit reconnaissance satellites in January 1965, they were dubbed Yoko-J because they were observed at the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal. Reich intelligence determined that the large apparent wing area, huge control surfaces, disproportionate air intakes, tandem canopy and sleek form meant this aircraft was an agile and powerful all-weather air superiority fighter rather than a bomber. In response, OKL launched the Superior Fighter Program (Überlegenjägerprogramm) later in November, which resulted in the Blohm & Voss BV 888 entering service in 1979.
Initial weapons clearance contemplated only the Type 17 Special Device, now outdated and carried singly in the spacious bomb bay, and the Type 23 Special Device, of which the bomb bay could hold two. Provision for four wing pylons was given for in the airframe but they were not cleared for service until 1968, which reflected the primary strategic nuclear role of the aircraft. In the meantime, low intensity conflict between the Indian Republic (part of the Co-Prosperity Sphere) and various rebel factions was escalating, and the appearance of muslim separatists employing Reich equipment became more common. The Imperial Navy pushed for clearance of conventional weapons, starting with anti-shipping missions. All Type 19 GP bombs were quickly cleared for internal storage and so were the Type 21 and 26 air-dropped mines. No anti-ship missiles could be carried internally and so the navy ordered new production units to carry all four wing pylons, and asked Nakajima for retrofit kits for all airframes already delivered.

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The enormous 3,000 kg Type 12 anti-ship missile was cleared for service by using a spring-loaded tailplane that was kept folded while stowed, and deployed on launch, but was never used operationally by the Imperial Navy in the G14N, since it was succeeded by the much more compact Type 19 missile. Only two could be carried on the outward pylons. The next mission to be considered was anti-submarine warfare, and both the Type 11 Depth Bomb and the Type 22 45 cm Torpedo were cleared for operation, initially only in the bomb bay. Some considered a waste to use the new Hot-Rod on long slow patrols to hunt submarines, but some commanders appreciated the ability to call for strikes almost anywhere at sea in case of contact.
A quaint opportunity presented itself to the Nakajima design staff when the Imperial Navy issued requirement 2621-ジ for a supersonic interceptor with high endurance for homeland defence missions, to replace the Kyushu J10W, which entered service in 1955. The requirements were to reach 40,000 ft in less than four minutes, and for a combat air patrol endurance of 3 hours or more. An armament of two Type 25 air to air missiles, one IR and one SARH, was specified. Nakajima modified the G14N by extending the fuselage fore of the air intakes, shortening the bomb bay and placing a Type 19 twin barreled autocannon in front of it. The main armament would be housed in the bomb bay which was of a rotary design, the cover rotating 180° to expose the missiles, which were extended into the airstream by pantographs holding the launch rails. The selling point of Nakajima’s offer, however, was the integration of an airborne early warning phased array radar, being developed by Hitachi since 1960. Named the Blue Hawk (青鷹, Aotaka), it operated on the X-band and would have a range of 200 nm and be practically inmune to contemporary ECM. This capability would enable the fighter to operate beyond the range of ground based early warning radar, whether airborne EW craft were available or not. The antenna was rather large, however, and the radar could not guide the Type 25 SARH missile anyways, so one antenna would be placed on each side of the front fuselage. The G14N4-J Ken’un would detect the target while on its patrol route, then manoeuver to engage with its nose intercept radar and missiles, then finish off stragglers with cannon fire. The project foundered when the homeland air defence mission was given to the Army Air Corps, ending a number of ground-based interceptor projects. Without a clear role now, the Blue Hawk was cancelled by the Naval Aerospace Technical Department in 1965, on grounds of current AEW platforms being satisfactory. Project Blue Hawk was continued by Toshiba in low priority, however, and eventually led to the Type 41 Air Radar which equipped the Mitsubishi A17M carrier fighter decades later.

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A speculative scheme for the cancelled G14N4-J.

On January 30, 1968, the All-India Muslim League officially declared the creation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, encompassing all rebel-held territory, claiming large portions of terrain controlled by the Republic of India and calling for the unity of the various separatist and muslim factions. The new nation was quickly recognized by various Greater Reich and Italian client states, including Iran, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. Imperial Japanese support in India had remained tacit and limited, including equipment, advisors and some very discrete volunteer formations operating with indian markings, but the Republic now pleaded for more support from Sphere forces. As the new nation was not recognized, the Co-Prosperity Sphere council approved of aerial sorties to be conducted in the region, but prohibited crossing into Afghan or Iranian territory. The brunt of operations was taken over by Imperial Navy forces, India being under the jurisdiction of the Navy due to its coastal nature.
Initial deployment of Hikōtai equipped with the G14N saw them flying level bombing missions over rebel concentrations and logistic hubs, mainly using iron bombs. Lack of enemy fighters and modern air defence systems contributed to the success of these raids, though the mobile and elusive nature of the rebels insured that strategic bombing remained a minor factor. Often, villages and crossroads marked for bombing by intelligence assets were already abandoned by the time raids could be mounted on them. This of course meant that strategic bombing was doing as much or more damage to the civilian population than to rebel forces. Initial deployment of the type by the Indian Air Force was undertaken by the 26th Bomber Squadron “Warriors” in early 1968, and by the end of the war, four IAF squadrons had switched over to the type, one of them, the 5th Attack Squadron “Tuskers” switching over directly from the Kawasaki Ki-102b in 1969.
The G14N had been earmarked for reconaissance duty early on, given its outstanding performance, and by 1968 a recce pod had been developed for a new version, the G14N2-C. The pod was installed in the former weapons bay, adjoined by a new internal fuel tank, and the sensors were located in a long underfuselage “canoe”. This pod included a side looking radar, vertical, oblique, split image and horizon-to-horizon panoramic scanning cameras, and infrared imaging equipment. The canoe didn’t seem to influence the aircraft’s outstanding performance, and these new units began operating attached to the combat Hikōtai already deployed in the Indian theater with great success.
As the conflict in India progressed, more Reich equipment was spotted, together with european merchant shipping flowing to and from Karachi. Naval intelligence was not naïve enough to think the Germans weren’t also sending volunteer forces, and they feared that the conflict could escalate into actual European intervention in Asia if too many German casualties were incurred. Thus, operations remained limited and non-military shipping was not attacked or detained.
The great offensive of late 1968 in the Gujarat and Punjab regions almost reached Karachi and Rawalpindi, but failed to knock the new country out of the war. Instead, the Pakistani counteroffensive which began in March 1969 pushed far beyond the pre-offensive lines and into Indian territory. Exemplifying the perilous situation is the siege of Surat, which lasted eight months and left two hundred thousand casualties, mostly civilian. The deployment of various Special Naval Landing Forces formations eased the situation for the Indians and managed to push the muslims back into north Gujarat. The great Rajasthan tank battles of 1969 exemplified the tactical skill and organization of the Indo-Japanese forces and left numerous enemy equipment and personnel captured. Enemy volunteers were identified as coming not only from Germany, but also Romania, Poland, Turkey and of course various asian muslim countries. Initial beliefs that the Pakistanis were fielding nothing more advanced than Type IV Mark L tanks gave way to confirmation of the presence of Entwicklung 50 derived tanks, which outperformed any tank yet deployed by the Indians or Japanese, all of which were light or medium vehicles. Even the Chi-Ri-Kai and Ho-Ri II AFVs used by the Indian heavy infantry regiments were no match for these modern medium tanks.

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The G14N came into its own during these battles, being forced into the ground support role it wasn’t designed for, but performing admirably in the face of mounting enemy air opposition. However, when dragged by external ordnance and locked into shallow attack runs, the bombers were easy prey for diving fighters. Close escort helped up to a point, but the rebels became very adept at aerial “guerilla tactics”, which involved small numbers of fighters ambushing unwary strike packages and retreating as soon as the situation stopped being favorable to them.
The losses of early 1969 encouraged the Sphere council to increase the level of intervention in the war, and in June 1969, operation Shimeru was approved by the Navy General Staff. The Kidō Butai, centered around the carriers Ryūō, Tenryū and Kasagi, was deployed to the western Indian ocean, with orders to eliminate all Pakistani naval presence in the area and stop the traffic of war contraband into Pakistan, by detaining and returning neutral shipping. Key to this operation was the mining of the port of Karachi. Commanded from the Light Command Cruiser Sakawa, thirty six aircraft from 763 Kōkūtai took part. G14N2s carried up to 16 mines both in the bomb bay and on external hardpoints, and were supported by A15Ks from the Carrier battle group. Three G14Ns and one A15K were shot down in the raid by SAMs and Focke-Wulf Ta 383s, suspected to be flown by German volunteers, for the loss of two of their fighters.
This and other raids convinced the Naval Staff that an aircraft specialized in the supression of enemy air defences was needed urgently, timid attempts being deployed since 1968 using other platforms. In September 1969, a SEAD variant of the G14N, the G14N3, nicknamed Raijū, began deployment to Kōkūtai in theater. This variant benefitted from more comprehensive ECM and radio direction finding equipment, sharing space in the bomb bay with a fuel tank, and was cleared for deployment of the newer Type 29 munitions dispenser, Type 21 ARM, Type 20 MCLOS AGM and Type 28 SALH AGM, the last of which required the aircraft to carry a Laser designator pod under a hardpoint, or rely on another aircraft or ground troops “painting” the target for it.

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The war in India was the first conflict which was widely covered by television in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and despite an enormous propaganda campaign broadcasted in 19 languages all over the Empire, the war was never popular with muslim citizens, which were a majority in many partner nations. By 1972, reports of atrocities commited in India, coverage of the large scale bombing of cities, sieges and displaced refugees had made the war unpopular even in Japan itself. The Dry Season offensive of late 1972 and early 1973 had pushed Sphere forces back beyond Goa on the coast and Agra on the north, and Mumbai was under siege. Marshal-admiral Keizō Komura, CinC of the Navy and maximum responsible for operations in India sought alternative strategies. He demanded from the Imperial Cabinet to approve one of two options. Either the IJN sortied into the Persian Gulf and the Red sea in order to close every port from where the Pakistanis were supplied, risking war not only with every Middle Eastern state but also with the Greater Reich itself, or he was authorized to use atomic weapons against strategic targets within rebel territory. The cabinet was apalled, either option risked toe-to-toe atomic war with the German Reich, which would threaten human civilization as a whole. The Admiral demanded a response or he would resignate within 24 hours. The cabinet faltered but then informed the Admiral that tactical atomic weapon usage was allowed, on the condition that this would end the war within three months.
While an extreme decision, and one surely to be unpopular with citizens all over the Sphere, IJN command hoped that the complete destruction of logistical centres would halt the moslem offensive on its tracks, literally. A reinforced formation created for this purpose, the Long Range Strategic Strike Air Group (長距離戦略的打撃航空隊 Chō-Kyori-Senryaku-teki-Dageki-Kōkūtai ), had already been put in charge of this duty, albeit using conventional weapons. This Kōkūtai performed long-range missions deep within enemy territory in order to distrupt its logistical chain, attacking bridges, airfields, highways, rail connections, ports and supply vehicles on land and at sea, but it had always been limited to strike within rebel territory. Their next mission would strike at the heart of the Pakistani supply chain, the port of Karachi. This seaport had been mined and bombed four times already, every time the Japanese airmen suffered considerable casualties and the port managed to reopen. Flying from Trincomalee in the island of Ceylon, their latest mission would entail the complete destruction of the port using a single atomic device. The Type 30 missile, with a 15-200 kt variable yield warhead, and the Type 31 bomb, with a 0.4-350 kt warhead, were judged too weak to reliably incapacitate the port, since Japanese atomic warheads were not very reliable in the yield obtained. Instead, the older Type 23 was to be used, set to a yield of 500 kt.
Two aircraft from 124th Hikōtai, each armed with a single device, would sortie on the 14th of February 1973, supported by six other aircraft of the same squadron, carrying air to air and anti-radiation missiles. They would meet over the Arabian sea with G8N3-Us from 3rd Hikōtai which would refuel them in flight on the way in, and would be preceded by UAVs of 15th Hikōtai, launched from G12N bombers from the same squadron. Descending to 30 m above sea level once within 100 km of the objective, the strike package closed in on Karachi at Mach 0.98. Soon before reaching the launch point, their radar warning receivers alerted them of SAMs in the area which were aware of their presence. The formation executed a steep climb and the lead ship dropped its bomb in a toss bombing maneuver, followed by a half-roll and a dive back to sea level to make their escape. The RWRs alerted them of various X-band radars painting them, which meant SAMs were on their way, too late to make any difference. A blinding flash visible even to the tanker aircraft confirmed the detonation of the Special Device. The Chokyosendakō made it back safely, and the UAVs were later recovered by the 2nd Special Naval Squadron led by Cruiser Sakawa, which was in charge of controlling air traffic in the area.

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Post strike reconaissance performed by a G14N2-C confirmed the complete destruction of the port facilities, several ships around it, the city’s airport, and most of the city itself. Analysis revealed that the bomb detonated with a yield way beyond 500 kt, thought to be in the 1 mt range, completely obliterating the center of the city. This was soon known to the media and what was later known as the Holocaust of Karachi in Europe made the headlines all over the world. Diplomatic notes from all client states of the German Reich were delivered to the Japanese government, and a few days later the Greater Reich demanded the immediate cease of the usage of atomic weapons by the Empire of Japan. Luftflotte 6 was deployed to Iran and began conducting recon missions all over the border and the Arabian sea, while increased air activity was immediately felt in North and South America, and over Central Asia. Suffering from low war support and protests by several segments of the population, the Imperial Cabinet informed the armed forces of their intention to bring the rebels to the negotiation table.
The rebels were no less shaken by the attack. Not only did they lose their major transport hub for good, but a great proportion of the Pakistani provisional government was killed, and many soldiers lost family and friends in a most unexpected way. Even when the rebels attempted to use the attack as a propaganda tool, morale dropped and eventually what remained of the rebel leadership was forced to accept negotiations. A ceasefire was immediately decreed throughout the Indian Theater, and after weeks of dispute, the Japanese convinced the Indian government to accept the recognition of a Pakistani state, albeit limiting it to a thin strip of land comprising the territories in the Hindu Kush and Spīn Ghar ranges and the land west of it, but also the region of Sindh. Kashmir and Punjab would remain Indian territory, despite currently being under rebel control. A 200 km demilitarized zone was set centered on the new borders, and a no-fly zone above it would be policed by the Luftwaffe and the IJN. Peace was achieved at a great cost, and mass migrations that began during the war intensified as muslims fled to their hard-fought home, while people of other denominations often chose to leave the former western regions to escape implied and effective persecution. The end of the war also brought negotiations into an atomic-weapons non-proliferation treaty, between the Empire of Japan and the Greater German Reich, which was signed on April 20th, 1975, in Mexico City.
The Nakajima bomber soldiered on, and experience brought by the war culminated in the vastly different G14N5 Shirozan-Kai, an improved interdictor version of the aircraft which took advantage of all the new weapons development that had matured during the war. This version was developed from the R7N1, a little-known strategic reconnaissance version of the Shirozan, allegedly capable of Mach 3 speeds and powered by two water injected Mitsubishi Ze-701-II-KAI low bypass afterburning turbofans producing 145 kN with afterburners.

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The switch to two engines instead of four was brought about by the development of powerful low bypass afterburners, the later Ze-701-III being chosen for the G14N5. This engine increased both total maximum thrust and improved fuel consumption during cruise, and also enabled the aircraft to supercruise at altitude (Mach 1.2). This also meant that the rear fuselage had to be redesigned around the new engines, reducing the rear fuselage profile and eliminating the rear set of top air intake hatches. The fuselage was lengthened behind the second cockpit, glazing for the WSO was increased, the ventral fins were reduced in span and increased in chord, and the rudder fins were increased in span. The number of external hardpoints was increased to eight, with two hardpoints on the outer wings limited to 800 kg loads, and two extra hardpoints being placed under the engine intakes, rated for 1500 kg. Internally the crew received revamped cockpits with a HUD, two multi-function colour displays and HOTAS controls, the bomb bay was redesigned, installing a Type 26 gun pod housing a Sumitomo Type 19 twin-barreled autocannon in front, and extending the bomb bay backwards. ECM antennas were installed on the wingtips and tail fin leading edges, and the sensor suite was updated with an infrared camera and laser designator rangefinder under the nose, and TV cameras under the wings. First flown in 1975, the G14N5s started deploying to active Kōkūtai in 1978 to high acclaim. This newest bomber was much more expensive than the aircraft it was supposed to replace, and partner operators often refurbished their vintage Shirozan, the exception being the Royal Thai Air Force, which received 27 G14N5s in 1983.
In the meantime, the recon versions of the G14N would see extensive use all along border regions. One famous example was the covert flights flown by IJN personnel from Chilean airfields in 1975 during the Beagle crisis, which resulted in violent skirmishes on land, air and sea. Total war was avoided thanks to the German Reich forcing the Argentine government to cease their demands for sovereignity over the channel, and documents about these operations wouldn’t be uncovered until 2006.
The G14N would not see major action again until the 1995 World War, in which airborne alert G14N6c aircraft, along with tankers, AWACS and drone-carriers participated in operation YATAGARASU, the retaliatory strike on strategic Reich targets, which brought about the end of the global conflict in December of that year.

Finally, I'd like to add a few things I wanted to see but didn't fit into the fluff.

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G14N6 in JASDF service, based on a real Mitsubishi F-2 scheme (you can find it in DarthPanda's sheet).

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G14N6 in Osean service because of course it had to be done.

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Sorry for the long post! I got a bit carried away, and I still want to do a couple more drawings that I'll be posting here. In the meantime, those not on the Discord can take a guess at which real aircraft concept I drew inspiration from.

Edit 1.- Added more drawings and fluff.

Shipbucket

Cold War Strategic Bomber Challenge

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