Could the coolant issue be mitigated through the use of an electrical heating element connected to shore power or a large battery for emergencies? I know they used something like that to pump frozen fuel out of the drain tank of the MSRE at ORNL, and FliBe has a much higher melting point than LBE. That's the idea I had when I first envisioned using LFRs for surface vessels. I don't know, maybe that's dumb.
And why is forward pilotage a bad idea? I'm trying to get some constructive feedback, and you're being quite vague. That's the theme I'm noticing here. It's always "No, that won't work. No, you're wrong. No, that has problem X." There's no "Well you could mitigate X with solution Y, but that creates difficulty Z. How do you intend to deal with the cost of Z?" Which is what I'd expect on this forum. Given that I've already read up quite extensively on the advantages and disadvantages of different reactor types, I haven't really learned anything from your responses so far that I didn't already know.
1. No. Metal lumps would still cool and aggregate at the corners and turns in the piping. .
2. Size and viewing perspective. The modern ship is over 200 meters long and is still an aft control 2-d object. The ship is not small or forward control like a missile.
I'm trying to get some constructive feedback, and you're being quite vague. That's the theme I'm noticing here. It's always "No, that won't work. No, you're wrong. No, that has problem X." There's no "Well you could mitigate X with solution Y, but that creates difficulty Z. How do you intend to deal with the cost of Z?"
When someone comes up with a neat idea, it usually is not originally with him. Instead someone else has thought of it first. Then the person who has the neat idea has to find out why the person who had the original idea in the first place could not make a go of it, or what went wrong that makes them abandon the approach.
I gave you the Alfa example (or rather it was brought up and I explained
specifically why and what went wrong). More on the Alfa in a moment.
Now I will explain why the USN experimented with electric final drives in surface ships post WW I and why they abandoned that approach in the mid 30s as well as why they did not adopt the large marine diesel as the Germans tried to do.
At first glance, one wonders why the diesel electric power train never made it into warships (and to a large extent, still hasn't). It, with a lot of research, is eminently doable by the 1920s. It offers several advantages over the steam turbine direct ration or geared transmission drives most 20th century warships used. What advantages?
Large transmission gears are difficult to cut. The French, Italians, English and Americans all have trouble with this technology when they adopt it. Everyone else
including the Germans at first had to have it hired out and done by foreigners. Then there are the turbines themselves. This problem particularly bedevils the Americans until the Nevada class battleships. The British have it solved for a decade prior. With diesels and an electric final drive, you do not need a special backing turbine, or reverse gearing to go astern. Then there is fuel economy. Then there is the fact that you do not have to wait 30 to 40 minutes to bring your boilers up to temperature, or have large floodable compartments in the center of the ship, or the possible boiler explosion or turbine shear from one lucky hit. A diesel electric system can be distributed and it can be subdivided and compartmentalized. Great. So why not do it?
Simple. Electrical load distribution systems (Tesla, so America has a huge tech advantage) still are poorly understood in the 1920s. (Refer to South Dakota at Guadalcanal or Saratoga when she is torpedoed twice). One critical failure in circuit design or one bottleneck unforeseen (Apollo 13 comes to mind) and your vessel goes dead and you with it. Diesels are poorly understood. The Germans know more about diesels than anyone around WW I yet their U-boats had mechanical casualties about as often as one would expect from such immature tech. Scale that up to drive a cruiser? Finally, if one can get it to work as scaled up (German armored cruiser Deutschland) then one discovers no end of wear, tear, and unforeseen mechanical issues (mechanical vibration, hogging, hull warp, ventilation failure as in carbon monoxide poisoning in the lower compartments) so that kind of offsets the gee whiz factor. All of that which comes up operationally can be foreseen when one does a system operations analysis. Diesel electrics are out except for submarine use until about 1950 when MANN finally figures it out. They modularize the diesel as jacketed cylinder sets on an exposed sectioned crank so it can be parts swapped without tearing holes in a ship. Simple, but it took an intuitive genius to figure it out. Battle short for electric loads comes to the Americans in 1943, (South Dakota Lesson), so Apollo 13 is saved.
Now back to the Alfa. WHY would the Russians (I'm familiar with their rockets, so I know they are excellent idea to design engineers who have a tendency to overestimate the capacity of their materials science. The N-1 and N-2 did not fail because of the NK15. It failed because a systems operation analysis was not properly executed. Soviet constructors could not properly assemble or weld together a pump feed assembly for 30 rocket motors.) build such a sub with a lead bismuth eutectic moderator and first cycle heat fluid? They had to know the shortcomings of an LFR. They built two on land to test the reactor concept before they ever built a sub around it.
The best explanation for why they built the Alfa is that they needed some kind of bodyguard submarine for their missile launching subs which at the time they had to send out into the middle of the Atlantic because their missiles were short ranged. Their submariners had tangled with Permits using Novembers Echoes and Charlies. They were losing in the bump and scrape war badly. The Russian sub drivers wanted a smaller deeper diver and a faster more agile boat than a Charlie to have a chance against the Americans. Never mind that the sub drivers were wrong, it was the Gorshkov navy, full of nutty ideas that did not and do not work. What the boss wants, he gets.
The Russian engineers did not have a LWR system that could drive such a boat. They needed a small powerful steam plant. They knew that a sodium metal two cycle reactor did not work thanks to the Skipjacks. But there is this lead/bismuth eutectic reactor that might work. They built two types that they could install into a small ~2,700 ton boat. It was intended to be a dogfighter. This is obvious by the types of torpedoes it carried. It has been a colossal disappointing failure. The Alfa can still outdive any western boat and outrun the same, but it cannot avoid detection at all and it cannot outrun or outdive American torpedoes. Detected first, it is an easy kill. There are the additional reactor issues (see above) and it appears from news reports that the Alfas lack needed open ocean endurance, have crew habitability issues and have suffered extensive reactor casualties. Only 7 were ever known to be built. These things were actually losing to Sturgeons, that is how badly bungled the design concept from reactor chosen forward was.
Now as to the LFR reactor in a merchant ship? The question is "can an external heater melt the LB circulation cycle system once the reactor shuts down?" Probably not, no; make that definitely not because the Russians once they wharf an Alfa up, have to immediately put that thing on dockside power to keep the reactor heated and "hot". That sort of demonstrates
in practice why the LFR is a commercial ship non-starter. The Russians cannot let the lead bismuth eutectic become a lump at all.