FLUFF AND STUFF: SOLVE IT IN THE WEAPON; GERTRUDE.
In the RTL, the WW II USN learned some valuable lessons about war-fighting, as opposed to war-planning.
............a. Practice results are no-accurate prediction of battle results.
............b. Human error is mathematically predictable.
............c. Machine error is mathematically predictable.
............d. but b+c= complete uncertainty and is unpredictable.
There is not much a bureaucracy (despite rumors to the contrary, the US navy is the one that floats) can do about d. or even b. (even rigorous training does not work if the people are not up to the tasking's requirement.); but some energy applied in the direction of c. yields synergistic effects out of proportion to a. and d that causes those two to converge sufficiently that prediction becomes more than guesswork.
What experience in warfighting allows the USN to close the gap between a. and d. by 1944? Just that word; "experience". By 1944, the USN has it in spades about how well its tactics work (They do not. See footnote^1.), how well the weapons work (Depends. See footnote.^2.), ; and how well the personnel do. (Generally slow learners. See footnote ^3.)
^1 About tactics, the learning curve in the price of admiralty still shows the Japanese tactically over-match their American opposites into 1945. The Japanese have learned operationally about Halsey typhoons in the 1930s. The Americans (especially Halsey), have not. And that is just the weather. The Americans demonstrate at Leyte Gulf, at their "confused" leadership level, such poor collective decision-making, that it makes the colossal Jutland fiasco, look like it was fought by British geniuses.
That at the operational art, they were just about barely equal to their Japanese counterparts in night surface tactics must be adjudged a false claim as Nishimura was a complete fatalist and Oldendorf with
a perfect textbook setup in geography, position, and force ratios failed to achieve annihilation. This is more due to poor fire-discipline along the American battle-line and mis-coordination between that line and the American destroyers than is generally taught in the popular histories. Communications failed. Shima turned tail and prudently ran for it after he saw Yamashiro broken up. Oldendorff was unable to pursue, because he lost control of his own forces. Fortuitously, Japanese cowardice and Shima's incompetent fleet handling saved Oldendorf from
a typical Tokyo Express battle drill experience a la the Battle of Kolombangara.
^2 and ^3 A better claim for American tactical experience and technical competency can be
made at Samar. Here another befuddled Japanese admiral runs into the one American admiral in the vicinity who seems to know what the hell he is dolng. This example applies directly to how American weapons work at this stage of the war and to the quality of the crews who wield them. Nothing dramatically shows the effectiveness of American weapons better than to realize that in a gunnery setup as lopsided as Surigao Strait is to the Americans is to the south, in this Japanese case, three of their prized cruisers eat a bizarro combination of air dropped depth charges, destroyer torpedoes and gunfire, bombs and the by now fixed Mark 13 aerial torpedo delivered by a bunch of hastily trained American naval reservists and recently drafted sailors. Even when everything American works to the peak of efficacy, the price in blood is incredibly steep. Just the same, as at the Marianas Turkey Shoot, the American lessons learned and applied to their means, both human and material, show
that if the weapons work and
if the crews can somehow get the weapons to hit targets, then despite faulty US tactics still present at the point of contact at Leyte Gulf clear up to the leadership operational art level at Leyte, the USN should still win and win easily.
The Japanese just are not good enough to beat the crews and weapons combination whichever way the local odds tilt on October 25, 1944.
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ONGOING RTL MISTAKES:
One could not say that of December 7, 1941 or especially December 7, 1931, that the Yankee Navy was ready for war. The RTL USN is outclassed; ship for ship, man for man, and especially admiral for admiral by Britain, Japan and France. The work the Roosevelt administration spent seven years and one billion dollars to correct this perceived at the time deficiency will not be enough. Frankly, Claude A. Swanson and company, make some extremely poor RTL decisions.
Given that shipbuilding budgets are tight; and that the US Army (senior service), is already squawking about a multiple front war as early as 1924, the USN shows a curious retrograde movement on their WW I specializations (Convoy defense and mine warfare) which should have shown up in War Plan Orange as amended in 1924. So, during the early 1930s, whereas a patrol submarine (USS Dolphin V-class, Hoover administration) had been designed and built to meet the 1924 plan, Swanson and his coterie go for the smaller cheaper coastal defense sub, and waste money on the "fleet destroyer" as there is an enormous backlog of four stackers for convoy work. Battleships are modernized in guns (but not engines) and somewhat refined, the few carriers tinkered with and millions wasted on Zeppelins, still attempted, despite 1920s era debacles with that type airship.
Platforms receive the lion's share of the navy budgets in the 1930s as was done in the 1920s. One must wonder at the failure to learn from the RTL mistakes made by Mr. McKinley's Navy, or from Mister Wilson's inept Navy at all.
PUT THE MONEY INTO THE MEN AND THE WEAPONS:
The RTL Hoover administration (Charles Adams; NavSec) shows the overlooked historical feature of introducing some curious programs that will saunter along under Swanson's totally incompetent and criminal mismanagement, during the Roosevelt years, to finally produce positive results in 1944 (after Henry Knox spends three more years bringing them successfully online in the middle of a world war.)
a. New generation of torpedoes for subs, destroyers and aircraft.
b. Diesel-electric power-plants for submarines; and patrol submarines.
c. A computerized torpedo fire control system that continuously updates, something no other navy has or will have until mid 1955.
d. A compact fire director system for AAA guns.
e. EFFECTIVE AAA guns.
f. Naval aviation
as a primary offensive arm in planes, weapons (especially an aerial torpedo at last) and ships.
g. Magnetic mines for laying by ships, planes and subs.
h. A return to fleet exercises as rehearsals for existing US war plans against Britain, Germany, France and especially Japan.
These are not the Franklin Roosevelt Administration's seeds. These are Herbert Hoover's.
In the AU, these trends are amortized and retroed to Warren Harding. In addition I've added some tweaks:
1. American cruisers keep their torpedo batteries.
2. American fleet-exs are oriented toward actual battle evolutions at night (as the RTL British RN does these years.) with emphasis on what to do when the enemy (red, gold, yellow, black or orange) attempts what Scheer successfully did to the British at Jutland; to deliver a coordinated night destroyer torpedo attack.
3. Testing of weapons as well as tactics. Spend the money on weapon proofs, instead of ice cream.
4. Seek the solution in the weapon and not the platform. Whether shell or torpedo, if the weapon reaches its enemy target and kills it, the surviving friendly platform that launched it will have fulfilled its war mission. The platform does not have to be the toughest, fastest, most heavily armed beast out there. The weapon, it launches need not be either. However it does have to be the most effective of type, whether projectile, mine or missile.
And that is the lesson and the tweak, Gertrude.