Shipbucket

FLUFF AND STUFF: SOLVE IT IN THE WEAPON; GERTRUDE.

In the RTL, the WW II USN learned some valuable lessons about war-fighting, as opposed to war-planning.

............a. Practice results are no-accurate prediction of battle results.
............b. Human error is mathematically predictable.
............c. Machine error is mathematically predictable.
............d. but b+c= complete uncertainty and is unpredictable.

There is not much a bureaucracy (despite rumors to the contrary, the US navy is the one that floats) can do about d. or even b. (even rigorous training does not work if the people are not up to the tasking's requirement.); but some energy applied in the direction of c. yields synergistic effects out of proportion to a. and d that causes those two to converge sufficiently that prediction becomes more than guesswork.

What experience in warfighting allows the USN to close the gap between a. and d. by 1944? Just that word; "experience". By 1944, the USN has it in spades about how well its tactics work (They do not. See footnote^1.), how well the weapons work (Depends. See footnote.^2.), ; and how well the personnel do. (Generally slow learners. See footnote ^3.)


^1 About tactics, the learning curve in the price of admiralty still shows the Japanese tactically over-match their American opposites into 1945. The Japanese have learned operationally about Halsey typhoons in the 1930s. The Americans (especially Halsey), have not. And that is just the weather. The Americans demonstrate at Leyte Gulf, at their "confused" leadership level, such poor collective decision-making, that it makes the colossal Jutland fiasco, look like it was fought by British geniuses.

That at the operational art, they were just about barely equal to their Japanese counterparts in night surface tactics must be adjudged a false claim as Nishimura was a complete fatalist and Oldendorf with a perfect textbook setup in geography, position, and force ratios failed to achieve annihilation. This is more due to poor fire-discipline along the American battle-line and mis-coordination between that line and the American destroyers than is generally taught in the popular histories. Communications failed. Shima turned tail and prudently ran for it after he saw Yamashiro broken up. Oldendorff was unable to pursue, because he lost control of his own forces. Fortuitously, Japanese cowardice and Shima's incompetent fleet handling saved Oldendorf from a typical Tokyo Express battle drill experience a la the Battle of Kolombangara.

^2 and ^3 A better claim for American tactical experience and technical competency can be made at Samar. Here another befuddled Japanese admiral runs into the one American admiral in the vicinity who seems to know what the hell he is dolng. This example applies directly to how American weapons work at this stage of the war and to the quality of the crews who wield them. Nothing dramatically shows the effectiveness of American weapons better than to realize that in a gunnery setup as lopsided as Surigao Strait is to the Americans is to the south, in this Japanese case, three of their prized cruisers eat a bizarro combination of air dropped depth charges, destroyer torpedoes and gunfire, bombs and the by now fixed Mark 13 aerial torpedo delivered by a bunch of hastily trained American naval reservists and recently drafted sailors. Even when everything American works to the peak of efficacy, the price in blood is incredibly steep. Just the same, as at the Marianas Turkey Shoot, the American lessons learned and applied to their means, both human and material, show that if the weapons work and if the crews can somehow get the weapons to hit targets, then despite faulty US tactics still present at the point of contact at Leyte Gulf clear up to the leadership operational art level at Leyte, the USN should still win and win easily.

The Japanese just are not good enough to beat the crews and weapons combination whichever way the local odds tilt on October 25, 1944.

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ONGOING RTL MISTAKES:

One could not say that of December 7, 1941 or especially December 7, 1931, that the Yankee Navy was ready for war. The RTL USN is outclassed; ship for ship, man for man, and especially admiral for admiral by Britain, Japan and France. The work the Roosevelt administration spent seven years and one billion dollars to correct this perceived at the time deficiency will not be enough. Frankly, Claude A. Swanson and company, make some extremely poor RTL decisions.

Given that shipbuilding budgets are tight; and that the US Army (senior service), is already squawking about a multiple front war as early as 1924, the USN shows a curious retrograde movement on their WW I specializations (Convoy defense and mine warfare) which should have shown up in War Plan Orange as amended in 1924. So, during the early 1930s, whereas a patrol submarine (USS Dolphin V-class, Hoover administration) had been designed and built to meet the 1924 plan, Swanson and his coterie go for the smaller cheaper coastal defense sub, and waste money on the "fleet destroyer" as there is an enormous backlog of four stackers for convoy work. Battleships are modernized in guns (but not engines) and somewhat refined, the few carriers tinkered with and millions wasted on Zeppelins, still attempted, despite 1920s era debacles with that type airship.

Platforms receive the lion's share of the navy budgets in the 1930s as was done in the 1920s. One must wonder at the failure to learn from the RTL mistakes made by Mr. McKinley's Navy, or from Mister Wilson's inept Navy at all.

PUT THE MONEY INTO THE MEN AND THE WEAPONS:

The RTL Hoover administration (Charles Adams; NavSec) shows the overlooked historical feature of introducing some curious programs that will saunter along under Swanson's totally incompetent and criminal mismanagement, during the Roosevelt years, to finally produce positive results in 1944 (after Henry Knox spends three more years bringing them successfully online in the middle of a world war.)

a. New generation of torpedoes for subs, destroyers and aircraft.
b. Diesel-electric power-plants for submarines; and patrol submarines.
c. A computerized torpedo fire control system that continuously updates, something no other navy has or will have until mid 1955.
d. A compact fire director system for AAA guns.
e. EFFECTIVE AAA guns.
f. Naval aviation as a primary offensive arm in planes, weapons (especially an aerial torpedo at last) and ships.
g. Magnetic mines for laying by ships, planes and subs.
h. A return to fleet exercises as rehearsals for existing US war plans against Britain, Germany, France and especially Japan.

These are not the Franklin Roosevelt Administration's seeds. These are Herbert Hoover's.

In the AU, these trends are amortized and retroed to Warren Harding. In addition I've added some tweaks:

1. American cruisers keep their torpedo batteries.
2. American fleet-exs are oriented toward actual battle evolutions at night (as the RTL British RN does these years.) with emphasis on what to do when the enemy (red, gold, yellow, black or orange) attempts what Scheer successfully did to the British at Jutland; to deliver a coordinated night destroyer torpedo attack.
3. Testing of weapons as well as tactics. Spend the money on weapon proofs, instead of ice cream.
4. Seek the solution in the weapon and not the platform. Whether shell or torpedo, if the weapon reaches its enemy target and kills it, the surviving friendly platform that launched it will have fulfilled its war mission. The platform does not have to be the toughest, fastest, most heavily armed beast out there. The weapon, it launches need not be either. However it does have to be the most effective of type, whether projectile, mine or missile.

And that is the lesson and the tweak, Gertrude.

FLUFF AND STUFF: THE WAGON WHEEL AND THE HORSESHOE.

If the 18th and 19th Century teaches navies that the merchant convoy formation is the box column cruise formation with the escort ships posted to windward to meet the raider threat, which will approach with the wind behind them, or in the age of steam up sun, as the enemy raiders will try to use the sun to blind an escort force. These same rules apply to actual battle fleets, since Jutland hinges on whether Jellicoe guesses where the German threat axis is and must rely on his scouting forces to be where they can make contact and report Scheer's position. The column to battle line change on port or starboard depends on that threat axis report which Beatty bungles.

Now apply the Jutland lesson to the brand new aircraft carrier and how a threat axis based on aircraft and submarines changes the defensive dispositions. Submarines of course imply a U-shaped formation with the bow of the U pointed in the direction of motion. The aircraft, though, force the U to close into a O. No radar, so the anti-aircraft defense has to be a complete perimeter defense. Combat air patrols have to be continuous and somehow lookouts have to be able to spot aircraft in time for orbiting fighters to tack onto the tails of attacking enemy aircraft before the attackers push over.

That air attack threat is crucial to understand when one reads about these nascent anti-ship tactics. Torpedo planes have to release their weapons in front of the target. Dive bombers, in order to correct for a dodging ship's turn, have to attack from astern. This split air threat vector complicates an already impossible intercept mission for 1931 era air defenders above a carrier deck. The combat air patrol must orbit the entire fleet perimeter. And here is another American dilemna. How do the escorts contribute to the air defense solution? Each escort ship receives a sector to cover with anti-aircraft guns. The aircraft carriers, two of them, swap attack and defense roles as needed for task force air defense. Remember, there is no radar. Maybe the skywatch and radio guard may get a few minurtes warning, but in the end, the guard ships may have to maneuver to put themselves in the way of bombs and torpedoes to save the aircraft carriers. The USS Hammann is the inadvertent and unsuccessful historical example of how this American tactic is supposed to work.

The Japanese solution was to launch fighters during the air attack, put the individual ships into radical turns to throw off enemy attackers’ aims at target ships and in the end rely on each ship’s antiaircraft guns to defend the ship at the last moment. The problem is that AAA for the Japanese is lousy, even by the lax 1931 standards, but this in 1941.

The Americans by 1931 have adopted sector defense and the wagon wheel O as a theory to be tested in their 1932 fleet-exercise. The Japanese, by stark contrast, rely on the horseshoe shaped U-formation to defend against enemy surface and submarine raiders as a fleet cruise disposition . It is the 1931 British fleet cruising defense tactics as the Japanese modify them for 1941 aircraft carrier warfare. The Americans, in the absence of radar, or of any system to give vector warning of air attack, may have overestimated their ability to meet a Japanese or British air attack through the use of vector defense. But again, to be fair, the 1931 aircraft to make their attacks have to push over and release within 1000 meters of their targets or drop torpedoes that close. The aircraft are not going faster than 70 meters a second. The planes are tube, wire, riveted metal, glued plywood and stretched cloth biplanes that would not look too out of place during WW I. The planes are slow, incredibly fragile, and well... good targets for British 2 pounders, American Browning machine guns, and Japanese versions of the early British Vickers 2 pounder pom pom they also use at this time.

IN THIS AU: Interesting changes.

The Japanese do not get the Type 96 French-designed Hotchkiss 25 mm auto-cannon. The Americans do, because Hotchkiss is located in Connecticut. (*As the Remington Mark 1q quad mount in 3cm/L50.) The Japanese will be stuck with the OQF 2 pounder Mark II, an over-glorified Maxim machine gun. The "Yokohama Piano" which comes from it; will be a slight improvement on the RTL Hotchkiss Type 96, giving an effective range of engagement of ~ 1500 meters. Murder on American torpedo planes in the 4 and 8 barrel versions, until the Americans develop the drop kit for the Mark 11 torpedo. Useless against 1941 Dauntless dive bombers. But not against Great Lakes BFs of 1931. The Japanese idea of each ship defending itself from anti-ship air attack by radical maneuvers and its own antiaircraft guns is quite valid and sound... in 1931.

Would love to see some drawings from the World War II period...

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USN components, camouflage colors, & reference links (World War II only)

This is a taste of things to come. I think I show trends and deviations from the RTL USN.

Which lexington class design are you basing this on? I cannot think of any that were poorly designed.

However, compared with the real life lexington, yours is. for reference: viewtopic.php?p=114567#p114567

- why is there an aircraft catapult there?
- your ship lacks hull depth
- you have deck edge elevators, something first used years later, while....
- the large hole required by the elevators also weaken the hulls strength (note there are none such in the real lexington)
- your anchors are way too small compared to the size of the ship
- you lack a gallery deck between hangar and flight deck
- the deck heights are not consistent over the ship, they look too low in the superstructure and too high in the rest?
- the turrets look quite small for their gun caliber. are they all AA guns, unable to be pointed horizontally?

I could go on for hours about finding weird stuff, let's go back to the basics here. take a look at the existing ships, and find out why things were done the way they were done. Deviate from that one thing at a time and find out what advantages and disadvantages this change had and look how you can make certain the ship still works.

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Drawings are credited with J.Scholtens
I ask of you to prove me wrong. Not say I am wrong, but prove it, because then I will have learned something new.
Shipbucket Wiki admin

I actually did not base it on the RTL Lexington at all.
--I scaled the draft to 9 meters. This conforms to a 262 meter pp and a 33 meter hull beam.
--American carriers, including the Lexingtons, at this time, had the hanger deck as the strength deck. Hull framing as a flexion issue and strength solution stopped right there. The flight deck, elevators, island, engine air intakes and exhaust outflows are; from what I can find on the subject; all superstructure features placed on it. This seems to hold true, despite the "apparent" weather plating up to the flight deck on the Lexingtons. It appears from the construction photos of the ships on the weigh, to be the exact way they were built; a pattern to be followed in the Yorktowns, Wasp, Ranger, Essexes, Princetons, Midways, all the way to the present. The hole in the hull issue, while quite valid for a British "box hanger" carrier of the 1930s and for the Taiho, is exactly what the Americans wanted to avoid with this way they built their own 1930s flattops. As such, they could easily get away with a deck edge lift on USS Wasp, which they designed in 1935. I just pushed it ahead ten years based on what they do to the Derfflingers, where deck edge lifts are the only way to put a flight deck and hanger over those narrow ships. (See above)
-- The anchors I scaled. One and a half cars long and a car wide is about right for a 40,000 tonne ship?
--The gallery deck is under the island, where it is supposed to be.
--The deck heights distortion to the viewer might be an optical effect from apparent as oppsed to true ratios. I vertical pixel count checked the portholes and hatches to make sure that each deck and overhead remained constant from bottom to top where the hanger was not involved. This optical effect could also account for the apparent hull draft problem. It is a longish flattop.
--I scaled the weather-house (It is not a true armored gunhouse), based on this weapon. The "relaxed" position for the 10cm/L50 is identical to what one might commonly see for the 5/38 of this era. The 5/38 DP guns generally point up and for the same exact trunnion reasons as the 3/70 AAA did when it was modernized into a semi-auto; the shell kicker makes the 45 degree relaxed out of battery position logical and mechanically necessary.
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That brings us to the seaplane, catapult and crane. It is weird to base seaplanes off an aircraft carrier, but here is my fluff rationale for that decision.

Seaplanes can land on water. Now this seems to scream cruiser as the mother ship, but here is the limiter. WNT Cruisers are already cramped at 10,000 long tons standard displacement to the point where they must sacrifice protection, some speed and crew comfort. The British try for a balance in their Counties, but they find early that they cannot have guns, torpedoes and aircraft at that displacement with all the other desired features. The British choose to sacrifice some guns. The Americans land torpedoes. The Japanese sacrifice seakeeping qualities, understate tonnages and cheat a bit more, but the point is, even when they went ahead to design the Tones and the Oyodos as essentially seaplane tender cruisers to serve as reconnaissance ships for their battle-line and aircraft carriers (1935?) they discover that a cruiser does not have the facilities to maintain a seaplane squadron.

In Mr. Hoover's Navy, the cruiser seaplane, (1) one each, is there for aerial reconnaissance, but these AU American WNT cruisers (see above). are smaller than a Northhampton. They do not have large aviation facilities for 3 or 4 seaplanes like a British County or a Japanese Agano. They rely on plane tenders when near a forward base; or at sea, they need an aircraft carrier for aircraft maintenance and support. And of course the American seaplanes of this era are longer ranged than their wheeled counterparts (The floats are gas tanks.), so a few seaplanes aboard the flattop serve as added long range eyes, and can also pluck downed aviators out of the water, when the pilots splash at some distance from their home bird farm.

Other features, such as the radio aerials, observer platforms, engine rooms, the hanger, deck edge lift placement, the Fessenden oscillator sonar, and even the screws are things I've thought about with this ship. What is possible and likely if a different choice is made? Not what is clearly impossible; such as IR ship detectors and radar.

It looks weird, because the speculative extrapolation is unusual. Despite superficial resemblances, RTL American, Japanese, and British 1920s carriers are more different from each other than any other ship type class, each nation constructs. This is no accident. I will explain a bit later in the fluff how it works AU and RTL.