Erik_t, if I am copying a production cruiser layout which do you think I am trying to achieve?
I'm not sure if this is a snarky answer to a question I didn't mean as snarky.
Truly, the USN (and for that matter, everyone else) had no real idea what the hell they were doing on the very earliest of missile ships. Especially on something larger like a cruiser, every effort was made to treat missiles as units of ordinance the same way gun ammunition had been treated: heavy, compact, to be located below the waterline if at all possible, with sufficient rounds on board for many successive engagements. It had not yet dawned on shipwrights that the fundamental nature of the game had changed: from now on, designs were generally going to be more volume-limited instead of weight-limited.
So in US parlance, first you see systems like Mk 4 on Boston and Canberra, which required gutting the rear of a big CA for a system that,
in a single brief engagement, was actually less effective than what would be shipped on a Leahy half its size. Seventy two missiles per director (they only had two of the latter), on a system with a range of maybe ten miles! Sure, you could probably fight through five or ten engagements before taking on reloads, but it wasn't yet realized that missile UNREP was much easier and cheaper in practice than colossal Terrier cruisers.
Something like Albany shows what could be achieved after these initial, hesitant steps into the missile age. Same size, mostly the same search electronics, but an abandonment of some of the more traditional weapons-handling traditions. Missiles were as low as they could go, but ready Talos rounds (a much bigger, more capable, and more dangerous to ownship system!) still sat on the main deck, below only splinter armor. Tartar was sitting right out in the open, expected to explode and vent damage outwards rather than be defended in a traditional cruiser sense. Fewer, bigger missiles with more attention to director/missile ratio made for a vastly superior CG.
Ships like Oklahoma City, Providence, these represented an intermediate step. Perhaps not much more effective than Boston or Canberra, but smaller and much cheaper to convert, with the entire GMLS sitting on the main deck.
It took a decade for the USN to figure out what made sense and what didn't (and there were even crazier unbuilt ideas, like the British missile-CVs and
this horrid Alaska creature). It was a big mental adjustment, and intermediate designs reflected the lessons still in the process of being learned.