Naval developments in late Cold War (1975-1990) and the 1975 Fleet Act
In November 1975 Finnish People’s navy faced its most severe peace time disaster when the Training Ship Aunus was sunk at heavy storm in the Barents Sea, outside Murmansk with all hands. This tragedy caused national wide shock and many recall the echoes of the 1905 war and saw Finnish navy once again sailing far abroad and causing embarrassment for the nation. But most importantly, in the political leadership, it was seen that the People’s Navy, the vanguard of the Finnish Defense forces was coming obsolete and poorly matching the requirements of today. Despite blaming such was bit farfetched in light of single maritime tragedy, especially as it lead the early retirement of the Navy’s high commanding officers, there were other, non-public issues going around in the same time that put enormous pressure on the Naval leadership and to the leadership of the entire military establishment.
In 1973 Novogorod held its Taifun war-games in the Baltic that included large scale amphibious exercises and general planning of Warsaw Pact war strategy in Baltic. Its operational goals dictated a rather adventurous plan where the Finnish contingent, consisting the amphibious forces and their escorts. Because of rather obscure planning phase done by Ground forces Generals and politicians, it was decided that the Finnish forces would use their own waters as initial grouping and Support area and move from there to the actual landing sites in Northern Poland. Similarly, Polish and GDR forces would use their own basins for such. In the actual Novgorodian composed Warsaw Pact War plans for Baltic, it was decided that Finnish forces would be used in more close proximity of their home waters, such as invading Swedish mainland or recapturing the Ahvenanmaa or Estonian islands, and Polish and GDR forces would attack the more strategically important Danish straits and Gotland. But because of political will to show massive joint landings to be filmed for propaganda purposes, the military planners decide to concentrate all landing activity into single operation. This proved not to be problem for the Southern member states, nor to Novgorodians who were lot better prepared for offshore deployments, in Finnish part it became problems since the inherent bureaucracy in Finnish Naval HQ resulted the war games to be used simultaneously to test and practice the actual Finnish war plans and doctrines which called heavy force distribution in the archipelago and mandated that all Finnish naval units would be based there. Despite the army staff did not see problems in the long sea march from Turku to Poland, the reality soon interrupted and after series of misfortunate maintenance problems, bad weather and poor troop habitability turned most of the participating 6 landing ships to return their port, or seek cover in Novgorodian Baltic coast, and in the end only 1 troop ship joined the combined naval task force. This was seen as great humiliation for the Finns and source of lot of Novgorodian oversight for Finland once again ruining joint allied naval operations. Many captain lost their position in following purges and in 1974, when only a naval staff’s conducted cardboard model wargames, Finnish naval units were not counted in for the amphibious role.
After the political fallout was settled, the Taifun fiasco caused deep analyses over the overall war capacity of the Finnish navy, by both internally, and then more superficially by the Finnish delegation in the Warsaw Pact combined supreme command. It was mainly observed that the Finnish made landing ships lacked the endurance required for long term deployments, the crews were not trained for long sea transfers, the ships engines were not economical for such use mostly because they were chosen with domestic production as paramount criteria. Also, the naval infantry were not trained and “hardened” themselves to spend long times trapped in the narrow vehicle decks of the rather archaic landing ships, and finally it was seen that the new fast gun boats were not ideal escorting such fleet for long distances. A committee was establish to overcome these faults and mistakes in the previous naval program, and it drafted a new plans for the fleet composition and for the building programs for the following decades. Since lots of new ship types were envisioned that were not able to comfort or modify from the existing vessels or production lines, a new naval program was suggested. This plan was left for the Central Committee in early 1975, and after the disaster of Aunus, the plan was quickly handled and got Parliament approval in the same year.
The main thesis of the program was to increase the distances and reach of the Finnish Navy, as well as its flexibility to conduct its share in the maritime theater in the Baltics during the general war, and overtaking the problems that plagued vessels that were acquired during the last planning period. Despite many foreign analyzes has often emphasis this new program and its rather grandiose achievements as desire for a blue water navy, The Finnish plans were never set for operations outside the Baltic sea.
Its biggest element and switch of concepts came in destroyers, as the old and rather small gun armed ships from early 50’s vintage were becoming obsolete and to be replaced. Originally it was planned to replace them with more Turunmaa class gunboats, but after the studies and experiences showed the types lack of endurance and seakeeping insufficient for Baltic range operations, a lot larger vessel was envisioned. It would be mostly intended to escort the Finnish landing ships, and cover their landing operations as well as provide escort for the sea based supply routes established during the war and also lead the smaller Finnish ships in more traditional sea denial operations. Also, it was mentioned that ships should have considerable margin and stability to support the demands of the alliance fleet operations in all aspects. This meant basically that the ships were demanded to be able to conduct all possible roles and purposes Novgorodian decided to give for its small allies in the Baltic, most prominently the participation of the joint task forces of escort vessels that trained with the Novgorodian Northern Fleet units in the Atlantic and North Sea. Secretly it was decided that the new “escorts” as they were then called would be ocean going vessels that would not sink from smallest storms nor remain inferior to the average opponents to cause any more humiliations for the Fleet in what it came to the foreign deployments.
After the design studies were concluded, it foresaw large ships of almost 1,500 tons armed with Air Defense missiles and naval artillery and would field surveillance radar equipment and medium frequency sonar as well as modern Anti-submarine ordnance. Such new capacities included in a new vessels with clear prestige value, it was decided that possible foreign assistance from Finnish allies would be needed in design and building work. After tenders were sent for Novgorodian yards, it became apparent that no such vessels were in production nor in planning state that could fit the Finnish requirements. As it was becoming typical, Novgorodian shipbuilding complex served prioritized to the Novgorodian vast ocean going fleet and its needs and most of the time vessels intended to operate in confined waters were several times larger than units fulfilling similar role in Finnish service. Thus the missile attack crafts Finland sought to acquire from abroad, were purchased from Soviet Union, which did place emphasis in small tonnage. Similar role Novgorodian units would have been corvettes of over 500 ton displacement. As for escorts, Novgorodian own fleet units were close to 3,000 tons, and were equipped with Anti-submarine missile systems and advanced sonars which Novgorod refused to export and which were not suited into the shallow Baltic where ASW operations had always been source of great difficulties.
It was not therefore surprise that the Soviet Union once again “won” this Finnish bidding, as after visiting the Nikolayev yards in the Black Sea, Soviets offered their Project 1159 class guard ships, which were specially designed for export for smaller navies replacing vessels of similar vintage as the old Uusimaa class destroyers. They covered pretty much all of the Finnish original requirements, par the propulsion side, which Finns originally insisted to be full diesels. The Pr. 1159 class featured similar CODOG arrangement that the Turunmaa class did, minus the diffusion propellers. After series of negotiations, Soviets allowed Finland to purchase the production plans to this class and after modifications by the Valmet Yard in Helsinki, three hulls were ordered from 1977 onwards and completed by 1983. They differed from the Soviet build examples serving in the Baltic in German colors by fielding larger bridges, lattice masts and in place of the Soviet OSA-M model SAM system, the Novgorodian PIRAMID was fitted with similar dimensions, as the system was also selected for ground force service. They also had the Novgorodian Kreposit back-to-back surveillance radar usually associated with the Piramid SAM system.
They were named after the Finnish communist party leaders and classified as “Saattaja” meaning escorts, whereas the Soviet Designation would have been SKR, a Guard Ship, the Novgorodian one as MEK, a small escort ship and the East German near sisters were called KSS or 1st class Coastal Defense ships.
They were successful vessels and with their close range air defense missiles, they mostly served as battle group leaders, mostly those of anti-submarine role, and it was originally planned to build two more armed with anti-ship missiles, but these plans were not implemented. They also participated in the joint Warsaw pact training cruises and the first two, Otto W. Kuusinen and Yrjö Sirola escorted the Finnish landing ships that took part in the 1981 “Zapad” war-games in Poland.
Second big investment came naturally in the submarine production, as it was apparent that even the relatively new M-class boats were inferior to latest Swedish and West-German boats and the technological gap was widening in alarming pace. Finnish submarines had conducted secret training missions alongside with the Novgorodian boats in the Gotland basin in the early 1970’s that showed the deficiencies of the older generation diesel boats in face of modern ASW equipment. A design study was started for creating completely new generation of Diesel submarines suited for Baltic operations and especially in the confined Finnish waters. Whereas there had been success of obtaining foreign products for the escort ships, it was soon found out that neither Soviet Union nor Novgorod were interested of producing small submarines, and the latest Soviet model, Pr.877, specially intended for export and for coastal operations, were almost 3,000 ton “leviathans” as the Finnish evaluation study described and completely unsuitable for the tactical requirements that the Finnish fleet insisted. Novogorodian vessels were equally large and despite this size vessels offered capacities to operate in the whole of Baltic, such role was not envisioned for the Finnish boats.
Technical assistance and incorporating the innovative design features of these type of boats were however accepted and the new Finnish boats were planned to be “scaled” down version of the tear-drop hulled and single shaft general layout. An 800 ton design tonnage limit was set and the prototype was completed in 1983. As the new generation diesel-electric propulsion (a Novgorodian one was chosen) was designed for much larger vessels, fitting them into the Finnish boat demanded rather peculiar solutions and thus the rear compartment has the distinguished “hunchback” form. Whether this affected the desired hydrodynamic features is not known nor revealed. The lead ship Iku-Turso completed her trials in 1985 and was commissioned into the naval service and the series production begun to replace both the Ahti and Vetehinen class vessels. They featured the latest Novgorodian made sonars and computerized fire control and caused great alarm among the NATO planners in Baltic that were rather accustomed for the mediocre performances of the older Finnish boats. 10 boats were originally planned but the construction was severely slowed down in the early 1990’s when the political upheaval and the end of Cold War slowed all military production, and only 6 were eventually build.
Biggest political need for the new naval program was to improve the amphibious capacity of the Fleet. As the humiliating events of the 1973 war-games showed, the Fleet needed longer range vessels that would be larger and have accommodation onboard for the troops it was to carry. After foreign designs were once again evaluated, it was decided to build and design the ships domestically, although East German Pr.108 was chosen as the basis of the design work. The Finnish vessels were altered from the original layout so that they had more modern self-defense armament, a helicopter deck and they lacked the shore bombardment rocket launchers, and the space reserved for them in the East German ships were used for more cabin space. A dedicated fire-support/command ship version was planned to be built on the same hull, but never materialized. It would have fielded the RLs in the place of the vehicle deck, and extensive command and HQ facilities inside the spacious superstructure. A logistical support ship version analog to the East-German pr.109 class was completed however. The lead ship Toivo Antikainen was completed in 1984 and her five sisters until 1990. After the end of the cold war, the program was halved, as the new defense doctrines and the fall of Warsaw Pact made their role in the strategic landings redundant.
Mine warfare had important part in the 1975 naval program as the last WWII veterans in the navy, the minelayers begun to approach the ultimate discarding age. In early on it was decided to separate amphibious operations and strategic landing-ships from the minelayer role, as the former would serve part of the General Forces and under Warsaw Pact leadership, whereas minelayers were seen more domestic role and during the advent of future conflict, it was seen paramount to keep simultaneously high alert levels for the landing forces as well as conduct the defensive and offensive mining in the Finnish waters and adjoining areas. The program authorized 3 ocean going and 6 coastal minelayers. Early on it was also decided that the first minelayer was to act as a training ship to replace the sunken Aunus. The need of the training ship was so paramount that Pohjanmaa thus became the first new ship class vessel completed from the 1975 program vessels in 1978, whereas the other components went through rather extensive evaluation progress.
The program continued in the 1980’s when studies for the new ocean going vessels were concluded. In mean time, the old Destroyer Hämeenmaa was fitted as minelayer and she kept her service until 1989. The next new build minelayer was Satakunta, in 1988 which was a dual-role support ship, with bow ramps and doors. The next two vessels were modified design from the Satakunta and featured reduced logistical and support ship capacities and they were completed as Hämeenmaa and Uusimaa in 1992 and 1993. After them, the Finnish navy fielded 4 large minelayers and the production was switched for the smaller Pansio class Mine crafts which were small coastal ro-ro freighter type vessels intended for logistical support work as well, and they also substituted the discontinued amphibious vessel programs.
In MCM role, the biggest lack was found in minesweepers capable of sweeping and hunting down magnetic, acoustic and pressure mines. To combatant these type of mines, new design solutions were needed and Finland became one of the first nations to complete GRP (Glass Reinforced Plastic) hulled MCM ships in the form of the Kuha class. Despite their design was started already during the 1958 Naval Program, the production and redevelopment was authorized in the 1975 program. They were novel crafts with their new hull material and placing their engines in rafted compartments in the upper hull to reduce the acoustic noise and pressure. Only their rather miniature size (90 tons, Also dictated by the desire of having low pressure effect) made them rather unnoticed in the larger Naval circles. They were accompanied by Kiiski class MCM boats, which were intended to be operate as drones, controlled from the Kuha class vessels. A larger follow on was planned in the 1980’s but the design work advanced slowly and didn’t materialize until long after the end of the cold war.
Biggest success and exchanged capacities for the fleet became however in the Fast Attack crafts. After the failures and misconceptions of the last program were carefully evaluated and analyzed, the new program envisioned completely new approach in the attack boat philosophy. The new vessels were to be much larger units, armed with medium caliber guns as well as missiles, and to have strong diesel only propulsion arrangement and to be easily configured for either attack boats with torpedoes and missiles, patrol boats, submarine chasers or fast minelayers. Single class of 30 ships were originally planned and the prototype was completed in 1981 featuring Wärtsilä diesel engines and Soviet made 76mm gun which was selected after trials were made along with the Novgorodian 57mm gun. The soviet weapon had the ammunition commonality with the larger twin mounts onboard the Escort ships and minelayer. Missiles were to be the Novgorodian Uran alongside their fire control radars. New Finnish made 400mm electronic torpedoes were also fielded at this time and the boats were to be armed with them as well. The prototype was named Helsinki, and thus begun the tradition of naming this type of vessels in Finnish service after the coastal towns.
Simultaneously with the Helsinki class vessels, a lot smaller fast torpedo boat prototype was build. A V-shaped hull reappeared along with new novelty, the water jet propulsion. Also first time such vessel was designed in stealth features in mind, and the then planned round shapes were featured in the Helsinki class as well, despite it proved out to be rather in effective solution. This new boat was named Isku and the operational concept of really fast attack boats were influenced by the East Germans who had built several small torpedo boat designs. Isku was originally intended to be a water jet propulsion candidate in series of tests were also Novgorodian build attack hydrofoils and hovercrafts were present. After the evaluation of all three types, the Isku class was selected as winner, since hydrofoils were deemed completely unsuited for coastal operations due their huge draft requirements when in port that prevented the tactical use of the archipelago and its skerries, as well as for their rather limited usefulness outside their fast maximum speed.
Hovercrafts were regarded much better, but since the examples of the Novgorodian Prut class were transport variants, the opportunity to use them as attack vessels were seemed too far away the capacities of the Finnish navy then. Alongside with the stunning performance of Novgorodian Desants in the 1981 Zapad war-games using dash attacks by hovercrafts, the type was accepted in limited service in its original role.
The Isku class was repeated with 6 vessels, but it was soon apparent that the modern war saw little use of small under 100 ton attack boats, compared to the larger Helsinki type vessels. But the advances in water jet propulsion was the biggest achievement of the small Isku’s and after 6 of the new Helsinki class boats were completed, it was decided to switch the production for an improved Rauma class design that featured waterjet propulsion. In addition, a near sisters of them were built for the Border Guard with limited engine output and reduced speed, but they were still regarded affordable as ASW and patrol platforms for the Navy as well, and 8 vessels were ordered of this type as well, despite the new Rauma class also retained the ASW capacity in form of the new Kaiku-14 sonar and the rather advanced Kaiku-15 variable depth towed array suite. The Uran missiles were introduced in 1985 and it was to be followed by several variants, including one with optical seekers developed by East Germans. After the end of the Cold war these plans were scrapped and in Novgorod, the production and design efforts were turned towards faster supersonic missiles launched from universal vertical launcher canisters. Finland introduced the Uran as MTO-85 and alongside its missile boats the missile was fitted onboard trucks to be used in land-launched mode. Finnish license production begun in 1989 and after series of difficulties at start, it continues till today and has fielded many improved variants.
As mentioned, the Novgorodian Pr.1305 Prut class hovercrafts were evaluated in 1979 and despite the attack hover-craft concepts were then discontinued, the vessel was seen most interesting for future studies in amphibious role and specially in the traditional archipelago warfare concepts that begun to reenter into Finnish naval planners interests as the old vessels in this role were been decommissioned. 5 additional vessels were purchased in 1980-1981 and development of domestic howercrafts begun. It was noteworthy that Finnish engineers had studied and designed these type of vessels as early as 1930’s but the WWII had prevented future contributions in this field and the concept was only slowly starting to take root in the minds of Finnish planners. The Prut’s were followed by 4 Jylhä class crafts in 1985-1989 which featured more powerful engines, a bow-ramp and MG armament. It was soon calculated however that hovercrafts, despite their unique abilities, were not cost-effective in small scale raiding landings in the Finnish waters. Their unit cost was expensive and the troop-capacity was rather mediocre to justify such high price tag. Water jets once again appeared to provide more affordable solutions, as new smaller diesels allowed fast traditional boats, made of light-alloy metals would be more mass-producible and offer all the tactical requirements needed for such operations in vast lower price than hover-crafts.
Much is speculated whether this decision was result of active lobbying of the ship and small boat building yards, since the hovercrafts were built at Halli Aircraft factories in Central-Finland.
Howercrafts were however seemed suitable for future evolution, especially when able to transport heavier equipment. Also the plans for missile armed attack hovercrafts were circulating through several of academies and design boards inside the military-industrial complex already during the last years of the cold war.
In regarding these small water-jet propelled landing crafts, the Meriuisko class vessels were essentially larger version of the land force pioneers Uisko type boats. 3 types of vessels were produced, from 1986 onward and continued in slow pace until 2010’s.
Finally, alongside with the numerous auxiliaries for fleet and local work (to be covered later) the old concept of logistical transport ferries continued in form of the Kampela class crafts, which were essentially just improved Kala class crafts build since 1950’s.
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