Finnish AU (Part III)

1958 Immediate Program and Naval Developments up to 1975

As the 1949 naval program was authorized by the central committee and kicked in, its procurements and programs run un-interfered for almost 10 years replacing the war torn tonnage and transforming the Finnish People’s Navy into its new “Light Coastal Fleet” structure. It was however soon realized that the designs and concepts crafted from the WWII experiences were outmoded and obsolete compared to the rapid technological advances that took place in International field during the 1950’s. Most important changes were the formation of the Warsaw Pact and rearmament programs in both Germanys that once again begun to fill the power-vacuum in the southern Baltics and change the operational priority of Novgorod’s Baltic Fleet into that direction. There was deep desire among the Novgorodian naval planners to incorporate all the new allied fleets of Poland and East Germany’s as well as the Finnish fleets into sort of auxiliary services into Novgorod’s Baltic strategies. Against these conditions, the Finnish delegate to Warsaw Pact command structures consisted mostly of naval officers, led by Vice-Admiral Berg. It was thought that the maritime defense issues were the paramount contribution and concerns of Finland within the new socialistic military bloc and this emphasis managed to win lots of freeway for the independency of Finnish Navy.
In other hand, the role of the Finnish delegation in Warsaw Pact’s Combined Supreme Command became rather strong in determine the future Finnish naval developments, much more than similar influence to the other service branches. During 1956 this delegate conducted an inspection to the People’s Navy and considered its combat effectiveness, readiness and overall capacities within the framework of the Socialist Alliance structure. Despite mostly positive report and it deemed Finnish fleet to be most potent of those in Warsaw Pact, it pointed several key features that were deemed insufficient in light of the new strategic situation.
- The Fleet was short legged, it was well able to conduct defense missions in Finnish waters, but its capacity to participate in more distant operations was not good.
- Despite its reconstruction, it was still seen too “defensive” and lacked good combined operation capacities.
- Its small size and concentration around few large destroyers effectively made it only single center point fleet, which could only use its capacities against enemy coming from one direction.

Against these points and other tactical revelations from its new ordnance, it was decided to construct new immediate program to remedy the 1949 programs defects. Two big operational changes were prepared. First was to divide the general forces into two fleets which both would be able to conduct independent operations. One would nominally be based on Archipelago Sea, and the Other in Porkkala, near the capital Helsinki. Also, the Archipelago Battle Group was to be disbanded and its units to be distributed to the local forces. Instead, a new dedicated Amphibious Unit would be created and the Coastal Jaeger battalion would be strengthened into a regiment.

In ship designs it was found that the Destroyers weren’t able to meet the goals attributed to them in the initial design studies. These were mostly contributed to the lack of modern naval artillery. Also their price was seen as too large and the Steam-turbine propulsion dated and unsuited for economical developments that were taking in Finnish maritime industry at that point. The new fleet was envisioned to be fully diesel powered and by Finnish made engines. Also, the escort vessels build on wartime design were seen too small and unsuited for their role and it was decided to combine the features of the escorts and destroyers into a new fast gunboat design that would field automatic main artillery and diesel engines.
Six of these new vessels would be build, to replace the old wartime destroyers and escorts. They would form the back bone of the second battle group and would include a training ship variant as well.
Submarines were regarded poorly matching those of western navies, and more speed, durability and quietness was demanded from a new design. It was to field most modern fire control and sonar technology available and build in numbers to fulfill the naval programs demand for 10 units.
Fast attack crafts were seen as adequate, but new technologies should be used in their constructions and design work for a larger, over 100 ton vessels should began. Finally, a development for amphibious attack units capable to conduct full battalion size landings should be most crucial for the new decade, and it was accepted that possible foreign units could be acquired to study the latest developments in these type of vessels.

This program was accepted in 1958 and run basically unaltered into 1975. Its main success laid in its flexibility, as it allowed the fleet to access into steady budgets for new construction and modernizations along its development programs advanced. It also allowed the Navy to respond into changes in its operational field without interfering its daily life by new programs and switch of doctrine changes.
The fleet procurements authorized in the Immediate Program begun in 1959 when it was decided to lay down the first two new Gunboats. This was done, despite the design was not satisfactory in the navy’s point of view, mainly to keep the yards employed and maintain the shipbuilding tradition for large warships. It also allowed one of them to be fitted as a school ship, which the navy mostly desired. They were roughly 1000 ton vessels armed with 2 100mm manually loaded DP guns and powered by Diesels. The First unit with Novgorodian build engines, and the School Ship variant with Finnish made one, reaching 23 and 18 knots respectively. This was far bellow of what was desired as was the armament. Further design work ensured and after it became possible for utilize the new Gas Turbine technology, the follow on ships were able to be designed for speeds up to 35 knots. Biggest obstacle was in the armament, And in 1966, after delegations send into Novgorod and Soviet Union resulted dim conclusion that no suitable automatic cannon was in sight to fit in the otherwise rather far headed planning parameters. It was then designed to revaluate the tactical-technical requirements and the operational concepts of the new vessels. The capacity to support army units at shore were dropped, as was the ability to contest with NATO cruiser size vessels, and therefore a 76mm range main aramament was choosen. As Novgorod didn't poses such weapon on its inventory, the Finnish naval desingers approached for Soviets and found the suitable twin mount for automatic 76mm cannons which were purchased then as new main armament of the fleet. This caused lot of discussion and heated fustration among the older generation of naval officers, but the planning progress was conducted by the shipyards and the political leadership of the naval staff without interference from the naval staff.

The gunboats were laid down in 1967 and completed in 1968 and 1969 respectively. Another pair followed 1970 and 1971 which gave the fleet four new fast corvette size vessels that were well suited in their role as leaders and flagships for the Small attack craft flotillas. These acquisitions allowed the Navy to decommission its old wartime escorts and escort-destroyers.

Submarines were partially designed by the Novgorodians and featured more streamlined hulls and more advanced engines as well as electronics to make them comparable to the new tactical environment in the Baltics. 6 Vesikko class boats were built between 1961 and 1966, and then four more in 1971-73 to replace the obsolete Ahti Class vessels.

The landing ship construction begun after Finnish naval engineers had studied the Novgorodian, Polish and East-German designs then under preparation. The East German Pr.47 class was found most suited for Finnish needs and a prototype was completed in 1963. It was followed by 11 serial production versions, which featured Finnish made diesels, which differed from the Soviet Union made ones from the East-German design. As Finnish engines were considerably larger and more voluminous, the design was altered and this reduced the transport capacity of the Finnish made boats, and also made it impossible to have the transport deck to be used as mine deck, as the aft mine hatches from the original design had to be moved because of the bigger engines. Despite these defiencies, the Ystävyys – Class vessels were well liked by the navy and the design was also adapted for civilian use as coastal freighter. Four of these civilian models were later build in altered form for the Navy in 1971-1972, allowing auxiliary conversions from the original production patch vessels.

The development of the new attack boats was rather more frustrating, as the first Finnish serial made diesels were unable to produce a suitable size vessel with enough speed. Also, by the mid 1960’s the missile age begun to reach smaller navies and especially the Soviets were pioneers to field small missile-boats that were investigated by Finnish planners with great dedication. It was decided that the new attack boats would be armed with Soviet Missiles and powered with maritime gas turbines from Novgorod. The new prototype was called Isku in 1966, and it was designed around the older Nuoli class hull that was enlarged to incorporate the missile systems and gas turbines. Despite it was planned to be held in “infinite” serial production, replacing the Nuoli class boats currently still produced, the first boats soon showed problems that cut the production into just 4 boats. Their engine automatization was rather new and trouble borne, and as they lacked any auxiliary engines, the failures in gas turbines often kept the entire vessel in operational for long periods. They were also rather poor sea boats and vibrated heavily in fast speeds made them unable to fire their main-armament in designed speeds. 4 hulls under construction were redesigned as torpedo boats, with lighter superstructures, and they proved out to be bit more successful vessels, though the machinery problems harmed them as well. In order to keep up with the other fleets and acquire more insight from foreign attack craft constructions, 4 Soviet Pr.205U class missile boats were brought in 1972. As they were diesel engine and mass produced as well as their sisters serving in the Polish and East-German fleets, they proved out to be successful and well liked vessels in Finnish service. The experiences from the Isku program was crucial in favor of the Diesel-Lobby and gas turbines were newer again tried onboard small attack boats. The Wärtsilä Machinery plant was able to complete its prototype fast diesels with sufficiently small size in middle of the 1970’s.

As the foreign build large minesweepers had to be all be abandoned by the early 1960’s, this left a serious gap in the mine countermeasure capacities of the fleet. Despite the small R- class boats were rather well liked, they were still seen too small for open sea operations, and a lot larger design was developed, using the Polish Pr.205F class as starting point for its capacities. The new Suursaari Class boats were largest minesweepers that were built in Finland so far, and provided the basis for a large series of 12 vessels to be constructed from 1965-1972. Good vessels, well suited for the needs of the day, they gave the navy valuable service through the remaining of the Cold War. The smaller R-class boats then under construction were redesigned as patrol boats and 6 such boats were build and during the early 1970’s, the original batch was similarly converted.

By the mid 1970’s, the Finnish fleet was able to rank itself as the strongest of the Baltic Warsaw Pact navies, mostly due its large submarine arm, despite in Finland, the role of the submarine arm still followed the rather traditional rear area raiding and anti-commerce roles. Finnish submarines still lacked the endurance for operations in the Southern Baltic. Together with serial production of the Vetehinen class (or Vesi class as they were called by the NATO) and the lack of Destroyer construction it was seen in the west how the Finnish navy was gradually abandoning large warship constructions and focus on Submarines instead. Also the problems in the attack boat designs were seen erroneously as lack of interests for the large Soviet style missile boat armadas. The biggest strategic threat in the NATO Baltic operations in Finnish side was indeed seen the submarines.

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