Shipbucket

Hello all. I was advised that this May be a better place for our discussions on Battlecruiser designs and disasters. The rules in this thread are just be polite. Observe the rules of engagement and no name calling. Any and all discussion about late ACRs and battlecruisers are welcome.

The Battlecruisers one magic moment happened 8 December 1914 when Doveton Sturdees' squadron met and defeated Graf Spee's squadron. The German ships were outgunned and too slow to get within range of their own guns.

The after action report was interesting in that the British BC's had shot away most of their ammunition in sinking Scharnhorst and Gneisenau because the firecontrol systems were not good enough to achieve hits at the ranges outside the German guns range. An interesting symptom that was to continue throughout the history of big guns. The guns could fire much further than average engagement conditions would allow. Right out to S & G II's eleven inch guns which could fire over the horizon but would have to have aircraft spotting support at those ranges.

Scharnhorst and Warspite are credited with the longest ranged hits with big guns, at 26,000 to 26,500 yards, Scharnhorst on Glorious, and Warspite on Giulio Cesare, the actions taking place in June/July 1940.

Not one of Jackie Fisher's better ideas. Best thing to do with any BC is take it back to dry dock and turn it into a carrier.

It's such a shame that the 1920 Lexington class never came into being. It would have been interesting to see how they fared.

Steve4866 - The Lexingtons were lucky to be converted to CV's, as BC's they sucked. The Amagi and Hood were probably a match while the G3 would have kicked it. That was the US's first try at the genre and they got it wrong. I don't know what the US learnt from Jutland but it was not how to build BC's.

The plain truth of the matter is the Germans built their ships tougher, better internal sub division, harder armour plate, etc. Tirpitz's maxim of " The primary function of a warship is to stay afloat is shown at both Jutland and Dogger Bank. The Germans one advantage is the High seas fleet was designed and built to fight in the North sea never more than 500 miles from base.Most German crews slept ashore in barracks when in port.
The RN's ships had to be able to get to Singapore and back to crew habitabilty was a major factor.
Even Jellicoe new this at the time. The problem with BCs is that according to R K Massie they are like two heavy boxers with glass chins"
Battle cruisers only worked so long as the enemy didn't have them as in the Falklands. Their wartime role of scouting for the battle fleet was always going to get them into trouble. When you add bad use to poor design it's only ever going to spell disaster.
For me the final factor is the Nelson sprit bred into British Admirals. The no captain can do far wrong by laying his guns along side the enemy don't work in the 20th century.
Turning them into carriers plays to the hulls strengths like speed, needed to launch aircraft. Extending the range of it's main armament by 150 miles and hopefully keep them out of the way of big guns.

This discussion is interesting, since it exhibits some of the persistent myths about the battle cruiser and its design rationale.
However, some arguments are flawed, since they reflect a reality that never was.
Thus,
at the Falklands, Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee was extremly lucky not to have both his battle cruisers trapped inside the Port Stanley Southern Canal, since, when, in the early morningof Dec. 8,1914, when KzS Julius Maerker's SMS Gneisenau spotted them in that inlet, they were busy coaling, due to the inertia of the British Admiral. It was, indeed (and sadly so for the involvedGermans!), Maerker's overly caution, causing him to reverse course upon being fired by the hidden stationary guns of the HMS Canopus, that doomed the German ships. Sturdee did make good his rather dilletante approach to hiscommand responsibility but basically cutting the mooring lines and have both Invincible and Inflexible raise steam quickly. But, as any thorough analyses of the battle will reveal it was an extremely close-run affair, and did not reflect well upon either Admiral or ship-type! To simplfy the German defeat by arguing that "The German ships were outgunned and too slow to get within range of their own guns." is to simplify it, without taking into advantage the potential advantages the German ships did enjoy!
That an atrocious FC-system resulted in an excessive waste of ammo on the British side is,however, undoubtedly true.
- In other words, but for the cautious reaction of Graf von Spee's close friend Capt.Maerker, the German ambush on the Falklands might very well have succeeded and netted the first two battle cruisers as their prize!
Also, as, I believe the above explanation, at least to some extent reveals, to invoke the, by that time, non-existent 'Nelson-Touch" is plainly wrong. This mental disposition had been effectively quenched already by the mid-19th c. Just reflect on the behavior of Rear Admiral Markham at Tripoli (Lebanon) on June 22, 1893, upon his acquiescence of the disastrous orders issued by Vice Admiral Sir George Tryon of conducting an inboard turn by squadrons in column. Nothing Nelsonian about that! Or consider Rear Admiral Ernest Troubridge's decision to disengage contact with the German Meditteranean Squadron of Konteradmiral Wilhelm Souchon. At the time Troubridge had four ACR:s in the 1st CS under his command (Defence, Black Prince, Duke of Edinburgh and Warrior) - none of which were exactly light-weight units! True is that Troubridge might very likely have suffered some losses, but the gain in his ships' being able to put paid to the German Squadron's so far unhindered foray into the Eastern Med, by crippling both German vessels would have justified such losses. (Remember, the British 9.2"-gun as shipped by these four big cruisers was an impressive weapon by itself!). Here, then, must be added the dismal way that Troubridge's immediate superior, Vice Admiral Sir Archibald Berkley Milne disposed his two battle cruisers - regardless of the noxious interference by Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty! Had either man possessed even a fraction of the "Nelson-Touch" things might have turned out very differently!
The BC was a flawed design, but no more in principle than most revolutionary ship designs! The most flawed was the fact that the British rather naively proposed that no one else would build them (hence the stringent secrecy when the Invincible was built!)! Once the genie was out of the bottle, it was up to how the different navies proposed to use them that decided their fate - and ultimate reputation! Thus Beatty's less-than-stellar tactical use of his vaunted Battle Cruiser Fleet at Jutland was an example of how not to use them, whereas the extremely competent handling of the 1 SG by Vizeadmiral Franz Hipper in the same battle is a textbook sample of how to do it. Likewise the one truly Nelsonian Touch action performed in the said battle was the inspired move by Rear Adm. The Hon. Horace Hood to put his hard-hitting 3rd BC in the perfect position to cross the German's "T' at around 1800 hrs that evening (May 31, 1916)!

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My Avatar:Петр Алексеевич Безобразов (Petr Alekseevich Bezobrazov), Вице-адмирал , царская ВМФ России(1845-1906) - I sign my drawings as Ari Saarinen