Oh wait, the Mk-71 would have had a longer range than the pre-ERGM Mk-45s. Oops.
That's incorrect.
The range of a Mk 45 5"/62 gun, with conventional projectiles using EX-175 casings is 40,000 to 42,000 yards. Using Mark 67 casings it's 25,000 yards (as opposed to the Mk-71's 32,000 yards). ERGM is 125,000 yards.
The HC Mark 25 Shell that the Mk-71 would have fired has twice the weight of the ERGM rounds for the Mk-45 Mod 4 (260lbs vs 110lbs)(
NavWeaps 2,
Navweaps 3). Also note that the Ticos can't take the ERGM in their magazines.
Yes but fires fewer of them.
as for the weights involved-
HC Mark 25 - 260 lbs. (117.8 kg)
New design projectiles: 240 lbs. (108.9 kg)
I used the new design weight. Either way it doesn't really matter.
8" 12 RPM/260 lb round, 3,120 lbs
5" 40 RPM/ 70 lb round, 2,800 lbs
8" 12 RPM/240 lb round, 2,880 lbs
5" 20 RPM/110 lb round ERGM, 2,200 lbs
When discussing the actual bursting charges, it pans out like I said. Assuming 7.7 lbs for the standard 5" munitions and 21 lbs for 8" munitions.
Except of course the Mk-71 has a max fire rate of 6 when using guided munitions.
Furthermore, it would be assumed that the Tico's would be upgraded to the 62 cal Mk 45 if they were going to be used in any seriousness for mitigating the Joint-Fires gap. The graphs include reduced number of ERM "like" munitions to represent the usage of an extended range munition.
Of course a single sixteen inch round could outperform a full minutes worth of firing from either gun in question.
Also note that Sustained rates of fire are broadly similar between the mounts once the ready magazines are exhausted. This is an advantage of the AGS system which is designed to be able to pull directly from the magazine without human loading, allowing for a higher sustained rate of fire. (
NavWeaps 4).
The graph lists how many rounds are carried on the ships, total.
Notice the DDG-51's round totals are listed at 7 ships. Meaning 244 per ship.
While I see where you get the numbers from (after having to hunt for them), I'm struggling to come up with a scenario where the USN would need to put 18,000 5" rounds in a single theatre inside of 17 hours. The only reason for such striking power is a large opposed landing by a large number of marines (which I don't see happening anytime soon), a mission that isn't supported by the rest of the naval force structure.
It's called the North-East Asia scenario.
The OMFTS scenario uses the South-West Asia scenario.
Even the OMFTS scenario requires 1,136 rds per day.
In order to understand the figures, you'd have to understand the OMFTS scenario. Either way, what any of us see happening soon has nothing to do with what the military determines in it's procurement process. Personally, I think they need to either mitigate the Joint-Fires gap, or get rid of it entirely. Obviously I'd prefer they mitigate the gap. Relying on air power for everything makes too many assumptions with too many uncertainties.
And forced entry scenarios are still the only way to get into a contested territory via amphibious means.
Air Power. Air Power solves the gap. The proliferation of UAVs at all levels is helping to offset the decline in manned assets, and is putting fire support closer to the front-line infantryman. Medium caliber naval fire support is never totally going away, but it is being reduced in importance with the rise of the UAV swarm.
No it doesn't. That's the oldest argument in the book and it never pans out no longer how long you debate the issue. The main problem with that line of reasoning, is that the military is the one stipulating requirements.
Aircraft, typically do not meet the 10 min response time that the USMC has stipulated.
Observe-
The CNA analysis points out that NSFS ships are very responsive and can be on
station for days. Aircraft, however, are limited to a few hours and sometimes, even
minutes on station without extensive air refueling. Significantly, even at an Alert-5
launch, aircraft never meet the ten-minute response time required by the Marines.
Unless they are already in the area of course. Also of note, is that it's not an issue so much with stationary targets, in which case bunker-busters can be used, unless the area has significant anti-air defenses. However, tanks and APCs are hardened targets which are mobile. Major caliber munitions achieved significant kills against vehicles in the Firesim XXI simulation, when compared to aircraft and other platforms. So it can be said, that gun systems have a serious advantage against mobile targets, in areas where significant anti-air capability exists.
Then there's cost and risk assessments that need to be taken into consideration.
In the NEA and SWA scenarios, anti-air capabilities are considered prohibitive when compared to naval fire support. Also, the military uses a weighted index for gauging the capabilities of near-peer competitors, and gauging what it would take to launch a opposed landing against such an opponent.
The costs in the graphs above point out the obvious. It would be
cheaper to mitigate the Joint-Fires gap with Naval Fire Support than it would be to mitigate it with TACAIR alone.