Hemera's War Service
Completed in March 1941, the work-up period had just finished, when the ship received its orders to join Force H. Hardly had the Hemera arrived than it was off to intercept the Bismarck, the last battleship survivor of the Denmark Strait action (see Ares class BB page 3 for description of battle). See Aphrodites War for details of the Force H interception of Bismarck with aircraft. Hemeras job was to watch the aircraft fly off and return, it carried out this duty with distinction. While tied to the apron strings of Force H, the Hemera did not have much to do. Not allowed to tackle the big Italian ships, this was undertaken by Renown and Dionysus. The change in circumstances was the ships transfer to Scapa Flow and the horror of Russian convoys, in winter. Paired with the British cruiser Edinburgh as close escort to PQ6, the two cruisers sorted it out that one would take the even numbered convoys, the other the odd numbered ones. While each ship was off with its convoy the other would be undertaking the slightly more harmless duty of covering the exits into the North Atlantic from around Iceland (Iceland to Greenland, Iceland to Faeroes). Both cruisers built up escort forces that would be sent with them. PQ7b was Hemera's next convoy with two destroyers and two trawlers as escort, all nine merchantmen arrived safely. PQ9/10 where all arrived safely. PQ11 also went undetected by German ships, U-boats or aircraft and arrived safely at Murmansk. So far Hemera had nothing worse than the weather to fight.
PQ13 was to be different. The voyage was uneventful until 24 March 1942, when the convoy was struck by a violent four-day storm, which left the convoy scattered and in disarray. The ships were dispersed over a distance of 150 miles. Over the next few days the ships coalesced into two groups, of eight and four, with four others proceeding independently. On 28 March the ships were sighted by German aircraft, and attacked. Two ships were sunk, Raceland and Empire Ranger. Also on the 28th a German force of three Narvik class destroyers, Z24, Z25 and Z26, under the command of KzS G Ponitz, sortied from Kirkenes. They intercepted Bateau, which was sunk, in the evening of 28/29 March, before falling in with Trinidad and Fury in the early hours of 29 March. Z26 was badly damaged by HMS Trinidad, sinking later after a combined counter-attack of Oribi, Eclipse and the Soviet destroyer Sokrushitelny, but in the course of the action Trinidad was hit by her own torpedo (the torpedo's gyroscope froze). The remaining German ships broke off the action as more escorts arrived including Hemera answering the Trinidads sighting reports, and Trinidad, escorted by Fury and Eclipse, limped into Kola Inlet, arriving midday on 30 March. In the meanwhile the ships of PQ 13 came under U-boat attack. Two ships were found and sunk by U-boats, Induna by U-376, and Effingham by U-435. Fury attacked an asdic contact and was credited with the destruction of U-585; however post-war analysis found that U-585 was lost elsewhere. By 30 March most ships had arrived at Murmansk; the last stragglers came in on 1 April. 6 ships were lost in this convoy. The Germans sank five freighters. One whaler, (HMS Sulla), was lost, probably due to heavy icing, and the cruiser, Trinidad, was damaged. Against this one German destroyer had been sunk. Fourteen ships had arrived safely, more than two-thirds of the convoy.
It was during this period that the Hemera lost two of its cruiser running mates, first Edinburgh then Trinidad succumbed to attacks from German forces. The battles around the Arctic convoys were heating up. The Germans had finally woken up to the amount of arms and materiel of war being shipped to Russia. Steps being taken by the Germans to intercept the convoys stepped up significantly.
PQ15 - The Allies expected PQ15 to be heavily attacked by German forces and the amount of warships covering the convoy in the distant and close escorts was large. 11 escorts and destroyers were in the close convoy escort with an AA ship. The close cruiser escort had a CL and two CA's (including Hemera) with two destroyers. The distant cover force had a CV, 2 BB, 2 CA, 1 CL and 10 destroyers. A veritable armada to cover the 25 merchantmen. On 3 May at 01:30 in the half light of the Arctic summer nights, six Heinkel He 111 bombers of I. Gruppe, Kampfgeschwader 26, the Luftwaffe's new torpedo bomber force, attacked the convoy, making the first German torpedo bomber attack of World War II. Three ships were hit. Two were sunk, and one was damaged and later sunk by the German submarine U-251. Two aircraft were shot down and a third damaged, which subsequently crashed. A further attack by German high-level bombers at dusk was unsuccessful. Deteriorating weather on 4 May prevented any German further attacks; an Arctic gale quickly turning into a snowstorm. PQ 15 arrived at the Kola Inlet at 2100 on 5 May with no further losses. Only a total of four German aircraft attacks took place, three of which had no affect.
PQ17 was to damage morale of the Royal Navy and put doubt in the belief of the mental stability of the Admiralty in London. The micromanagement by the Admiralty of PQ17 showed the damage that can be done by overiding the man on the spot. The covering forces for PQ17 were similar to PQ15, but the distant cover force was almost too distant to be of use if the Tirpitz had sortied. Just the mention of Tirpitz going to sea caused chaos. The distrust between the Royal and Merchant Navy took a long time to heal.
PQ 17 was the code name for an Allied Second World War convoy in the Arctic Ocean. In July 1942, the Arctic convoys suffered a significant defeat when Convoy PQ 17 lost 24 of its 35 merchant ships during a series of heavy enemy daylight attacks which lasted a week. The German success was possible through German signals intelligence (SIGINT) and cryptological analysis. On 27 June, the ships sailed eastbound from Hvalfjord, Iceland for the port of Arkhangelsk, Soviet Union. The convoy was located by German forces on 1 July, after which it was shadowed continuously and attacked. The convoy's progress was being observed by the British Admiralty. First Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound, acting on information that German surface units, including the German battleship Tirpitz, were moving to intercept, ordered the covering force away from the convoy and told the convoy to scatter. However, due to vacillation by the German high command, the Tirpitz raid never materialised. As the close escort and the covering cruiser forces withdrew westward to intercept the presumed German raiders, the individual merchant ships were left without their escorting destroyers. In their ensuing attempts to reach the appointed Russian ports, the merchant ships were repeatedly attacked by Luftwaffe aeroplanes and U-boats. Of the initial 35 ships, only 11 reached their destination, delivering 70,000 short tons (64,000 t) of cargo. The disastrous outcome of the convoy demonstrated the difficulty of passing adequate supplies through the Arctic, especially during the summer period of perpetual daylight.
I hope I have shown the gradual increase of the dangers of the Arctic convoys. There was no other place that had the perils for such long periods for warships and merchantmen. If you were not fighting the enemy then you were fighting the weather. The book HMS Ulysses by Alistair McLean is an exceptional fictional account of a Russian convoy. If you have not read it yet, check it out of your local library and do so. It should be mandatory reading for any sea warfare buff. Henrik may be able to give us some idea of what those poor devils on Arctic Convoys had to endure, but the rest of us are probably a bit coddled in our insulated homes.
After PQ17 the Arctic convoys were suspended until September which gave the Hemera time to be recalled to Atlantis for a full refit period to upgrade the electronics systems and give the crew a decent period of leave. The Hemera arrived back in Icelandic waters just in time to join the escort for JW51B. The short synopsis of the Battle of the Barents Sea is: The Battle of the Barents Sea was a naval engagement on 31 December 1942 between warships of Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine and British ships escorting convoy JW 51B to Kola Inlet in the USSR. The action took place in the Barents Sea north of North Cape, Norway. The German raiders' failure to inflict any significant losses on the convoy infuriated Hitler, who ordered that German naval strategy would focus on the U-boat fleet rather than surface ships.
In addition to the convoy escort, the cruisers HMS Sheffield HMS Jamaica, AWS Hemera and two destroyers were independently stationed in the Barents Sea to provide distant cover. These ships, known as "Force R", were under the command of Rear-Admiral Robert L. Burnett, in Sheffield. The German forces included the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper; heavy cruiser (often termed a pocket battleship) Lützow; light cruiser Magdeburg; and destroyers Friedrich Eckoldt, Richard Beitzen, Theodor Riedel, Z29, Z30 and Z31. These ships were based at Altafjord in northern Norway, and were under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Oskar Kummetz, in Hipper.
The encounter took place in the middle of the months-long polar night and both the German and British forces were scattered and unsure of the positions of the rest of their own forces, much less the enemy's. Thus the entire battle became a rather confused affair. During the battle it was not clear who was firing on whom or even how many ships were engaged. This is where the new electronic outfit fitted to Hemera in its refit came into its own. Hemera had been able to track its own forces ships and was able to tell them where they were in relation to each other and which way the enemy was. The Germans had split their forces into 3 groups, with one cruiser and two destroyers in each, trying to split the Convoy Escort to allow one or more of the groups an unhindered run at the convoy. These were good tactics and almost worked. It was the weather that played the biggest part in saving the convoy. The weather stopped the Germans from being able to co-ordinate their attacks with the precision expected of them.
The first phase of the battle had the Hipper approaching from the south of the convoy. The ships were picked up on the escorts radar and Captain Sherbrooke concentrated his destroyers and went out to chase off the Germans. He did leave two destroyers and the other smaller escorts with the convoy. Sherbrooke was injured in the following action with Hipper and command of the escort then fell to the Commander of HMS Obedient. This is where the Germans were hamstringed, they were to attack the convoy without risk of losing any of the big cruisers. So a feint torpedo attack was enough to get the Hipper to turn away. While Sherbrooke was away with the Hipper. Phase two had the Lutzow Group hove into sight of the convoy and sink the minesweeper Bramble and the destroyer Achates. The Achates had managed to get the Lutzow also to turn away by actually firing torpedoes at it. The convoy was wide open. The Magdeburg Group was coming in from a northerly bearing thinking their Christmases were all coming at once. Magdeburg Group was blindsided by Force R, the cat pounced on the helpless mice. Firing orders were passed by Admiral Burnett, the two 6" cruisers would take a destroyer each while the Hemera got the cruiser to play with. At this stage of the war the flashless powder of the guns gave an eerie feeling with the guns firing. Burnetts flagship Sheffield quickly sank its destroyer opponent without receiving damage itself. Jamaica badly damaged its opponent before it managed to escape into the distance. Hemera also made short work of the Magdeburg. Taken by surprise the Magdeburg was unable to use its best advantage - speed. The big 9.5" shells of the Hemara tore big holes out of the Magdeburg and after only a few hits in the centre of the ship, the Magdeburg was crippled with no power. Jamaica at the rear of the line closed and fired one bank of three torpedoes which hit along the length of the Magdeburg which rolled over and sank. First blood to Force R. The Magdeburg Group had signalled the arrival of the three cruisers of Force R, but the Hipper was on a return leg to the convoy, after the main destroyer force of the escort had been called away to chase off the Lutzow on the other side of the convoy. Admiral Burnett and Force R was on its way to deal with the sighting of the Hipper when the Lutzow also cam back into sight of the escorts on that side of the convoy. Admiral Burnett detached the Hemera to deal with Lutzow while he took the other two cruisers to go after the Hipper. This was what the Hemera and Phanes had been built for, running down and killing cruisers. Lutzow may have had 11" guns but its armour was no better than any other Treaty cruiser. Lutzow though was slow, only 27/28 knots compared to Hemeras 33 knots. Once the Hemera got the Lutzow in sight only a luck hit from Lutzow could have saved it. Lutzow was unlucky. Over the next 30 minutes the Hemera got closer to the Lutzow and inflicted damage then more damage, then fatal damage. Lutzow had done well and hit the Hemera with five of the big 11" shells but had hit non-critical areas where the resulting damage could be controlled. Lutzow's speed bled away as the damage to the diesel engines slowed the ship. The destroyer Obedient closed the Lutzow and administered the coup-de-grace hitting with three out of a four spread of torpedoes. The Lutzow went down. The Hipper having heard of the losses of the Magdeburg Group and Lutzow, turned and ran before Admiral Burnett could catch up.
Aftermath of JW51B.
Despite this German attack on convoy JW 51B, all 14 of its merchant ships reached their destinations in the USSR undamaged.
Even more critically for the outcome of the war, Adolf Hitler was infuriated at what he perceived as the uselessness of the surface raiders, seeing that three cruisers were driven off by mere destroyers, and losing two of the cruisers to boot (the Allied cruisers were conveniently forgotten). There were serious consequences: this failure nearly made Hitler enforce a decision to scrap the surface fleet and order the German Navy to concentrate on U-boat warfare. Admiral Erich Raeder, supreme commander of the Kriegsmarine, offered his resignation—which Hitler accepted, apparently reluctantly. Raeder was replaced by Admiral Karl Dönitz, the commander of the U-boat fleet, who saved the German surface fleet from scrapping; though Hipper and two (Emden and Leipzig) of the light cruisers were laid up until late 1944, and repairs and rebuilding of the battlecruiser Gneisenau were abandoned and just as importantly the completion of the Graf Zeppelin was again delayed. E-boats continued to operate off the coast of France, but the only major surface operation executed after the battle was the attempted raid on Convoy JW 55B by the battleship Scharnhorst, which was sunk by an escorting British task force in what later became known as the Battle of the North Cape.
This was the end of Hemera's participation with the Arctic convoys. It was withdrawn back to Demeter for the repairs to the damage caused by Lutzows shells and went on to join the Atlantean Fleet that arrived at Hawaii to be joined by Force Phanes, to become TF71 whose service are noted above in Phanes war service record.
Post war and the Hemera was Flagship of the 1st Cruiser Squadron which spent its time tied to the carriers and battleship of Fleet One. 1950 and like the Phanes the Hemera is surveyed for future employment. Unlike the Phanes, the Hemera received the big tick for rebuilding with the new missile armaments coming into fashion.
I could probably use some help to ensure I have enough radar in the right places to run the missile systems.
My original thought was to do one cruiser in a US missile outfit and the other cruiser in a UK missile outfit.